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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court, in deciding the scope of state
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
and tribal power to regulate hunting and fishing on the Crow Reserva-
tion, held in March of 1981 that the state of Montana holds title to the
bed and banks of the Big Horn, a river flowing through the center of
the reservation.1 The Court largely ignored established doctrines of In-
dian law. It also, for the first time, required the recipient of the federal
grant to overcome a presumption that the United States holds the beds
and banks of navigable rivers in trust for future states.2
Under the doctrine of ownership of the beds and banks of naviga-
ble waters, state sovereignty vests at the time of statehood to facilitate a
public trust for purposes of fishing and navigation in favor of its citi-
zens. This rule has been recently expanded by the Court to inhibit the
recognition of grants of soils beneath navigable waters prior to state-
hood. Cases until 1892 dealt with small parcels of land and unquali-
fiedly allowed such grants before statehood by the United States and
other sovereigns. State sovereignty vested subject to those grants.
Since 1892, the Court has been confronted with more general Congres-
sional legislation to facilitate settlement of vast amounts of land and
treaties with Indians. The problem became one of deciding whether
prior grants had, in fact, been made of lands beneath navigable waters
prior to statehood. In solving the problem, the Court has either relied
upon Indian law principles of treaty interpretation or has applied in-
creasingly restrictive rules of conveyancing to federal grants.
The decision in Montana v. United States judged treaties between
the United States and the Crow Tribe against conveyancing rules of
such stringency that the general rule is effectively changed to vest state
sovereignty in soils beneath navigable waters when a territory is ac-
quired by the United States Government. Not only must the above-
mentioned presumption against a granting during the territorial period
be overcome, but the grant apparently must satisfy additional require-
ments that it have been made for an "appropriate public purpose" in
order to satisfy a "public exigency. ' 3
As a result of the decision, ownership of the beds and banks of
navigable rivers within public lands and Indian lands is subject to
question. Because of the characteristic vagueness of Indian treaties,
lands reserved for or held in trust for Indians are in particular jeop-
ardy, especially if the Court continues to ignore, as it did in this case,
the usual rule that requires construing treaties as they would have been
1. Montana v. United States, I01 S. Ct. 1245 (1981). The decision does not address
the issue of rights to water within the river.
2. Discussed in text accompanying footnotes 216 to 240, infra.
3. Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 1253 (1981) citing United States v. Ore-
gon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1934). The Court also quoted Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 411
(1842) and Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 672 (1891). Grants were to be in "clear and special
words" or the "claim confirmed in terms embraces the land under the water of the stream."
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understood by Indians. Although other federal reserves such as na-
tional parks and national forets might be distinguished, nothing in the
Court's opinion would preclude application of the rationale to these
entities.
The decision makes possible an ongoing federal-state conflict.
State ownership of land beneath navigable waters supports a public
trust in favor of citizens of the state. Treaties with the Crow created
federal servitudes which support an ongoing federal trust in their favor.
The purposes of these state and federal trusts are in conflict, and the
United States Supreme Court has said that this particular type of con-
flict is not to be allowed. States should never be allowed to interfere
with the federal trust relationship with Indians.4
The most surprising thing about the case, and prior cases involving
Indian lands, has been its failure to discuss the public trust aspects of
state ownership of lands beneath navigable waters. Concepts of a pub-
lic trust originated in the narrow area of navigable waters, and al-
though the public trust doctrine has spread rapidly to other areas of
law,5 twentieth century cases precisely related to the origin of the trust
doctrine have completely ignored it and related federal servitudes. The
conflicts in Montana v. United States and similar cases could be more
appropriately settled by once again relying upon those principles.
II. BACKGROUND OF MONTANA V. UNITED STATES
A. The Crow Tribe
The Crows migrated from the Lake of the Woods area of Mani-
toba to a location near the Missouri River in the Dakotas in the six-
teenth century.6 Their change in location was part of the general
territorial adjustment after the introduction of the horse to the North
American continent. In the mid-seventeenth century, they migrated
further west to the general area of southern Montana and northern Wy-
oming.7 Like other plains tribes, they subsisted on available game, pri-
marily buffalo, and moved to take advantage of the most abundant
supplies.
Plains Indians were under constant pressure to defend their areas
4. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
5. The court in United Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State Water Conser-
vation Commission, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976) found that the public trust doctrine re-
quired planning by the state before water permits could be issued for coal-related energy
proje,,s. See also Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911) holding that the federal gov-
ernment holds public lands in trust for the general public.
6. Brief for United States at 1, Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981).
7. The Crow Nation v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 238, 242 (1935).
1981]
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
of subsistence from encroachment. Nevertheless, the Crows main-
tained control of the immense Yellowstone basin for about 200 years.
Serious impacts from white settlers first affected the Crows after
the discovery of gold in California in 1849.8 Immigrants crossing the
Great Plains used timber and slaughtered game, and the creation of
continuously used trials altered game patterns. The United States had
engaged in costly wars with several Indian tribes. Congressional ap-
propriations were made and commissioners appointed to carry out ne-
gotiations with tribes on the Great Plains to end hostilities and obtain
rights of way across Indian lands.9
In the late summer of 1851, all of the major tribes residing south of
the Missouri River, east of the Rocky Mountains, and north of Texas
and New Mexico assembled at Fort Laramie in what is now Wyoming
to negotiate a treaty among themselves and with the federal govern-
ment.10 To avoid future clashes between tribes, each recognized speci-
fied "tracts of country" as its respective territory. That recognized by
the Crow comprised 38,531,174 acres within the area of the future
states of Montana and Wyoming."
The Indian parties agreed to maintain peaceful relations, 2 recog-
nized the right of the United States to establish roads and military
posts,' 3 and bound themselves to make restitution for wrongs commit-
ted against the people of the United States lawfully passing through the
area.' 4 The United States promised to protect Indian signators from
depredations committed by the people of the United States. 5 Indian
signators were promised $50,000 annually by the federal government. 16
The Crows remained friendly with the United States. They com-
mitted few depredations on whites in the area and served often as army
scouts. This, in fact, created increased hostility between the Crows and
surrounding tribes.' 7
Following the Civil War many of the signator tribes of the Treaty
of Laramie became actively hostile toward increasing settlement and
inunigration. Vigorous military operations resulted in the Indian wars
of 1865 and subsequent negotiated peace settlements. The Crows were
not among the warring tribes, but were included in the concluding se-
8. Id.
9. Id. at 242 and 243.
10. Treaty of Fort Laramie, Act of September 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749.
11. Id., Article 5.
12. Id., Article 1.
13. Id., Article 2.
14. Id., Article 4.
15. Id., Article 3.
16. Id., Article 7.
17. 81 Ct. Cl. 238, 247 (1935).
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ries of treaty negotiations. In July of 1868 the Crows and the United
States negotiated an agreement reading in part:
The United States agrees that the following district of country
... shall be, and the same is, set apart from the absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein named,
and for such other friendly tribes or individual Indians as
from to time they may be willing, with the consent of the
United States, to admit amongst them; and the United States
now solemnly agrees that no persons, except those herein des-
ignated and authorized so to do, and except such officers,
agents, and employees of the Government as may be author-
ized to enter upon Indian reservations in discharge of duties
enjoined by law, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle
upon, or reside in the territory described in this article for the
use of said Indians, and henceforth they will, and do hereby,
relinquish all title, claims, or rights in and to any portion of
the territory of the United States, except such as is embraced
within the limits aforesaid.'
8
The treaty reduced Crow territory by 30,530,764.8 acres to 8,000,409.2
acres. ' 9 Subsequent cessions to the United States government created
additions of 3,849,950 acres to the public domain and 7,728.32 acres for
use as railroad rights of way.20 Final cessions reduced the Crow hold-
ings to 2,282,764 acres.21 Payment was made for all of these cessions.
Negotiations carried on by the federal government with the Crows
and the resulting addition to the public domain aptly illustrate federal
policies of land acquisition. Felix Cohen wrote:
[P]ractically all of the real estate acquired by the United
States since 1776 was purchased not from Napoleon or any
other emperor or czar but from its original Indian owners.
What we acquired from Napoleon in the Louisiana Purchase
was not real estate, for practically all of the ceded territory
that was not privately owned by Spanish and French settlers
was still owned by the Indians, and the property rights of all
the inhabitants were safeguarded by the terms of the treaty of
cession. What we did acquire from Napoleon was not the
18. Act of May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649, Article 2. Another group of Crow, known as the
River Crow, was generally based in nother Montana near the Milk River. United States
authorities planned at first to assign them to a territory to be shared with the Blackfeet and
Gros Ventre in north central Montana. It was later thought preferable to combine them
with the "Mountain Crow." Although unwilling to make the change of location, they peace-
ably complied. 81 Ct. Cl. 238, 248, 265 (1935).
19. United States v. Montana, 504 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979).
20. The tribe was paid, or received benefits on its behalf, $1,726,009.04 for these ces-
sions. 1,082,000 acres were sold and the proceeds paid to the tribe. 81 Ct. C1. 238, 265-266
(1935).
21. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979).
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land, which was not his to sell, but simply the power to govern
and to tax, the same sort of power that we gained with the
acquisition of Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands a century
later.
It may help us to appreciate the distinction between a
sale of land and the transfer of governmental power if we note
that after paying Napoleon 15 million dollars for the cession
of political authority over the Louisiana Territory we pro-
ceeded to pay the Indian tribes of the ceded territory more
than twenty times this sum for such lands in their possession
as they were willing to sell. . . . [T]he keynote of our land
policy has been recognition of Indian property rights. And
this recognition of Indian property rights, far from hampering
the development of our land, was of the greatest significance
in such development. Where the Government had to pay In-
dians for land it could not afford to give the land away to
favored retainers who could, in turn, afford to hold the land in
idleness. Because land which the Government had paid for
had to be sold to settlers for cash or equivalent services, our
West has escaped the fate of areas of South America, Canada
and Australia, which, after being filched from native owners,
were turned over, at the same price, to court favorites, Gov-
ernment bureaus, or other absentee owners incapable of, or
uninterested in, developing the potential riches of the land.22
While the public domain via purchase from the Crow and other
tribes of the Great Plains increased, steps were being taken for the ad-
dition of new states in the area. The Montana Territory was created in
1864, the Organic Act reading, in part,
That nothing in this act contained shall be construed to im-
pair the rights of person or property now pertaining to the
Indians in said territory so long as such rights remain unext-
inguished by treaty between the United States and such Indi-
ans, or to include any territory which, by treaty with any
Indian tribes, is not, without the consent of said tribe, to be
included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any
state or territory; but all such territory shall be excepted out of
the boundaries, and constitute no part of the territory of Mon-
tana, until said tribe shall signify their assent to the president
of the United States to be included within said territory, or to
affect the authority of the government of the United States to
make any regulations respecting such Indians, their lands,
property, or other rights, by treaty, law or otherwise, which it
would have ben competent for the government to make if this
22. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28, 34 (1947).
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act had never passed.23
Montana was admitted to the Union in 1889, and the Enabling Act
granting statehood made the following restrictions in relation to Indian
lands:
That the people inhabiting said proposed states do agree and
declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the un-
appropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held
by Indian or Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall
have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall
be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States,
and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute juris-
diction and control of the congress or the United States;
24
The next major federal action to affect the Crows and the state of
Montana was the Crow Allotment Act.25 The Act made no direct pro-
vision for the acquisition of reservation land by non-members. Allot-
ments were alienable, with certain restrictions, after twenty-five years.26
The Secretary of Interior was also authorized to sell allotments held in
trust if the sale were approved by the allottees or an heir.27
Indian complaints about the depletion by whites of game on the
Crow Reservation began as early as 1873.28 Between 1912 and 1923 the
Agency Superintendent and Commissioner of Indian Affairs corre-
23. Organic Act of the Territory of Montana, Act of May 26, 1865, 13 Stat. 85.
24. Act of February 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676. Montana Constitutional provisions
have continued this policy. See MONT. CONST. of 1889, ord. 1, § 2, "FEDERAL RELA-
TIONS BE IT ORDAINED: .... Second. That the people inhabiting the said proposed
state of Montana, do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the
unappropriated public lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian
tribes, and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the
same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian
lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United
States .. " See also MONT. CONST. art. I, "Compact with United States all provisions of
the Enabling Act of Congress (approved February 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676), as amended and of
Ordinance No. 1, appended to the Constitution of the State of Montana and approved Feb-
ruary 22, 1889, including the agreement and declaration that all lands owned or held by any
Indian or Indian tribes shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the con-
gress of the United States continue in full force and effect until revoked by the consent of the
United States and the people of Montana."
25. Crow Allotment Act, Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 751.
26. Id., Sec. 13. Restrictions were intended to discourage the creation of very large
blocks of privately held land on the reservation. Id., Sec. 2. The policy has not been alto-
gether successful as can be seen from the result in Montana v. United States which places
about 1,260 square acres of land beneath the Big Horn River under the control of the State
of Montana.
27. Id., Sec. 15.
28. Statement by Blackfoot, Brief for United States at 4, Montana v. United States, 101
S. Ct. 1245 (1981).
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sponded about the problem. The tribe petitioned the United States to
place limitations on outsiders and to "conserve fish and game" on the
reservation.29 The Tribal Council closed the Reservation to hunting
and fishing by non-members in 1954 and 1957.30 This ban remained in
effect until 1966 when mountain areas of the reservation were opened
for hunting, and fishing was allowed with the purchase of a tribal
permit.3 '
In 1957 the federal government condemned 5,677 acres within the
Crow Reservation for the site of Yellowtail Dam, constructed on the
Big Horn River.32 The dam created a lake within the newly created Big
Horn Canyon National Recreational Area,33 and established a uniform
stream flow enhancing the propagation of species of trout not native to
the stream.34 Nearly all land riparian to the Big Horn River within the
reservation is owned by Indian allottees, but two riparian tracts
purchased by the state facilitated access to the river.35
Non-member fishing greatly increased. An estimated 6,800 per-
sons fished the Big Horn River in 1973.36 In October of 1973 the tribe
voted to close the reservation to hunting and fishing by non-members.
The stated purpose of the action was "to help alleviate the game and
fish shortage and to help the economic conditions of the Crow peo-
ple.'" 37 The state of Montana continued to authorize hunting and fish-
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 162 F. Supp. 108 (D. Mont. 1958).
33. 16 U.S.C. 460t et seq.
34. Brief for United States at 3, Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981). The
State of Montana has stocked fish in reservation streams since 1928 and first introduced
brown and rainbow trout to the reservation. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service
began fishing management on the Crow Reservation in 1964. In 1970 the tribe entered into
an agreement with that agency, later the Bureau of Sport Fishery and Wildlife, for technical
assistance to carry out fish stocking and management independently. The State of Montana
planted elk in the Bighorn Canyon National Recreational Area. 457 F. Supp. 599 (D. Mont.
1978).
35. Brief for United States at 3, Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981).
36. Id.
37. Crown Tribal Resolution 74-05. Concerns were voiced about rising food costs, in-
creasing tribal membership, and decreased supplies of fish and game. Brief for United
States at 5, Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981). The Superintendent of this
Crow Reservation, when reporting on the resolution, said,
The resolution to disallow hunting and fishing on the Crow Indian Reserva-
tion expresses the feelings of the Crow people with regard to the ever increasing
pressure on reservation game and abuse of hunting and fishing privileges. The
tribe's desire to close the entire reservation reflects the grave concern of its mem-
bers over the erosion of one of the most valued resources and hereditary rights.
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ing within the reservation.38
B. The Litigation
James Finch, while standing on property owned by the State of
Montana and casting his lure into the Bighorn River, all within the
exterior boundaries of the Crow Reservation, was arrested for violating
a federal statute prohibiting unlawful fishing upon land belonging to
an Indian tribe.39 When tried in federal district court, charges were
dismissed upon a finding that the title to the bed and banks of the Big-
horn River were in the state of Montana and trespass under the federal
statute would not lie.4" This holding was reversed by the circuit
court.4 The decision was vacated by the United States Supreme Court
on other grounds and the issue of ownership of the river bed was not
This office is convinced that the Crows concerns are well founded and that under
existing circumstances their action is timely and fully justified. * * *
1. Hunting pressure on the reservation has increased to a point where game
is depleted or non-existent in vast areas. * * *
2. Regulation of hunting and fishing has become increasingly uncontrollable
with the general public taking advantage of situations beyond the Crow Tribes'
ability to control. * * *
3. Actions by the State of Montana and the National Park Service indicate
that their unannounced policies are directed toward the development of the entire
Crow Indian Reservation for hunting and fishing including the Tribal lands of the
Big Horn Mountains, and without regard to the desires of the Crow Tribe of Indi-
ans. * * * The press of public opinion to open the entire reservation to hunting
and fishing is overwhelming, except for the resistance of the Crow Indians.
4. Regulation of hunting and fishing on the reservation is ineffective under
present conditions. * * *
a. The general public has taken advantage of interspersed fee and Indian
trust lands to utilize the whole reservation without respect to land status.
b. The permit system in force prior to this resolution brought in revenue
estimated at $8,000. The FY 1972 Tribal Program spent $19,500 for Game
Wardens and the FY 1973 Program has set up $95,000 for this purpose. * * *
c. * * * Enforcement by the [S]tate [of Montana] is only token to say
the least and the [S]tate does not even give the appearance of recognizing that
there is a problem.
d. The State of Montana has opened a big game season on Big Horn
Lake which includes deer and elk. * * * The Crows sold [this] land to the
federal government for the sole purpose of building a dam and reservoir. It
was not the understanding that big game hunting would be permitted in this
area.
Brief for United States at 6, Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981).
Crow concerns that fishing would aid tribal members meet subsistence needs are sup-
portable. Census figures for 1970 revealed that Indians had the lowest median income of
any national group. Less than half of Indian men were employed. Urban Indians, men and
women, were unemployed at twice the national rate. Forty-eight percent of rural Indians
and twenty-five percent of urban Indians were below the poverty level. Dept. of Health,
Education and Welfare, Pub. No. (05) 75-122, Study of Selected Socio-Economic Character-
istics of Ethnic Minorities Based on the 1970 Census 3 (1974).
38. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1165 (1979).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1980).
40. United States v. Finch, 395 F. Supp. 205, 213 (D. Mont. 1975).
41. United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822 (1976).
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decided.42
Suit was then instituted by the United States Government, as
trustee for the Crow Tribe, to quiet title to the bed and banks of the
Bighorn River. Also at issue was the authority of the state of Montana
to regulate hunting and fishing on the Reservation.43 The district court
again held that Montana held title to the bed and banks,' and this was
again reversed, the Ninth Circuit relying upon its rationale in Finch.45
The circuit court held that the tribe could regulate hunting and fishing
by non-members, but could impose no criminal sanctions and could
not prohibit hunting and fishing by resident, non-member fee owners
upon their own property. The state was also found to have the author-
ity to regulate non-members upon the reservation. Non-members
were, in effect, bound to meet whichever standard, state or tribal, was
higher.46
Ruling that a presumption exists that the bed and banks of naviga-
ble rivers are held in trust for future states, the United States Supreme
Court held that the language of treaties made with the Crow in 1851
and 1868 did not overcome that presumption. The United States had
not granted beneficial ownership of the river bed in either the 1851
treaty, in which the Tribe did not surrender the privilege of hunting,
fishing, or passing over its "tract[s] of country," 47 or the 1868 treaty,
which "set apart [land] for the absolute and undisturbed use and occu-
pation of the Indians herein named .... -4" Although the establish-
ment of an Indian tribe could be "appropriate public purpose," there
was, in the case of the Crows, no "public exigency" which would have
required Congress to depart from its policy of reserving ownership of
beds under navigable waters for future states.49
The Court's holding concerning the Tribe's power to regulate
hunting and fishing was tied to ownership. Tribal regulatory power,
and power to exclude non-members was allowed only on allotted lands,
tribal lands and lands held by the United States in trust for the tribe.
As for lands within the reservation owned in fee by non-members and
state-owned lands, which now include the bed and banks of the Big-
horn River, continued regulation by the state of Montana was allowed.
42. United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 676 (1977).
43. 457 F. Supp. 599 (1978).
44. United States v. State of Montana, 457 F. Supp. 599 (1978).
45. United States v. State of Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (1979).
46. Id.
47. Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 1252 (1981).
48. Id.
49. Id. at p. 10 of opinion.
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III. PUBLIC LAND ISSUES
A. Introduction
The following section will trace the development of the law of
ownership of beds of navigable waters and the related uses attached to
that ownership. Because policies central to these public lands issues are
direct descendants of English law, English theories of sovereign owner-
ship of lands beneath navigable waters will be examined. The develop-
ing case law in the United States will then be traced. First to be
discussed will be controveries which arose because of prior grants by
the English Crown on the Middle Atlantic Seaboard. Next will be
cases concerning congressional confirmation of Spanish grants in Mo-
bile, Alabama after Alabama became a state, and congressional grants,
again in Mobile, before Alabama statehood. Another early set of cases
involving Spanish grants of trust lands in San Francisco will be dis-
cussed. Decisions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries concerning
the extent of federal patents granted by Congress under general acts
opening the West and Indian land cases decided since 1912 will be
evaluated. The policy reasons for the doctrine were often thoroughly
discussed through the 19th century and they will be presented. The
physical extensions of the doctrine of state sovereignty over navigable
water from tidelands to interior rivers and lakes will be noted. Finally,
the section will discuss the continuing conflict resulting from the Mon-
tana v. United States decision and more appropriate ways to solve such
conflicts.
B. The English Doctrine
Ideas of ownership in England advanced from a concept of per-
sonal ownership of the kingdom by the Crown, that is, ownership by
the proprietor, to ownership as a sovereign in favor of its subject.50 Ex-
panding concepts of sovereignty were generally inflicted upon an un-
willing monarch by such means as the signing of the Magna Carta5 l
and acts restricting the Crown's ability to grant lands without Parlia-
mentary consent.5 2
The Crown owned all of England, including the beds of the seas.53
Grants of tenure to uplands were made as a means of gaining political
support from recipients.5" Those lands not granted and all of the seas
50. H. Farnham, The Law of Waters and Water Rights 166 (1904) [hereinafter cited as
Farnham].
51. Id. at 167.
52. Id. at 170.
53. S. Moore,.A History of/he Foreshore and Law Relating Thereto 377 (1888) [herein-
after cited as Moore].
54. Farnham, supra note 50, at 176.
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were part of the "Great Waste." 55
The king's ownership of the seas extended up rivers as far as they
were affected by normal tides. 6 Beyond that point, in the "fresh" wa-
ters, ownership was presumed to be in holders riparian to the streams. 7
The Crown had early exercised the right of recreation in fresh
water streams by granting to itself prerogative rights to all fish and foul
before others could use the waters for those purposes." The Crown
could also grant individual rights, termed "several" rights, to fish in an
area. It was common to allow, by grant, the creation of weirs at the
mouths of rivers. This prejudiced upland owners by stopping the
movement of fish to fresh waters. It also, to some extent, inhibited nav-
igation. The signing of the Magna Carta ended these practices. 9
Thus, on the uplands, servitudes shifted from uses in favor of the
Crown to ones in favor of tenured owners.
No public rights of fishing were available in upland streams, but
public use of some upland streams for navigation had become a com-
mon practice. These streams were considered common highways.
Public use of the "Great Waste" was generally allowed and it was here
that the concepts of public servitudes of use, the jus publicum, was
strongest.
There appears always to have been a common right of navigation
of the seas, probably subject only to the Crown's jurisdiction to protect
the coastline from invasion.60 The right was so strong that any private
rights in the Great Waste were subject to the common right of naviga-
tion. Matthew Hale in his comprehensive treatise De Jure Mars stated
the right in this manner:
The people have a public interest, ajuspublicum, of pas-
sage and repassage with their goods by water, and must not be
obstructed by nuisances or impeached by exactions ....
For the jus privatum of the owner or proprietor is charged
with or subject to that jus publicum which belongs to the
king'e subjects; as the soil of a highway is, which though in
point of property it may be a private man's freehold, yet it is
changed with a public interest of the people, which may not
be prejudiced or damnified.6
Another ancient right associated with the Great Waste, the right to
fish, or the public common of piscary, was a more limited right subject
55. Id.
56. Id. at 179.
57. M. Hale, De Jure Mars, reprinted in Moore, supra note 53, at 370.
58. Id. at 372.
59. Id.
60. Farnham, supra note 50, at 175.
61. M. Hale, De Jure Mars, reprinted in Moore, supra note 53, at 404.
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to rights in the Crown or granted by the Crown.6 2 Hale described the
right:
But though the king is the owner of this Great Waste,
and as a consequent of his propriety hath and primary right of
fishing in the sea and the creeks and arms thereof; yet the
common people of England have regularly a liberty of fishing
in the sea or creeks or arms thereof, as a public common of
piscary, and may not without injury to their right be re-
strained of it, unless in such places or creeks or navigable riv-
ers, where either the king or some particular subject hath
gained a propriety exclusive of that common liberty.63
Notions of public use were expanded when, in a long and unsuc-
cessful battle, the Crown attempted to lay claim to the thousands of
acres which comprised the foreshore, that area which lay between low
and high tide. The Stewart kings seized upon a theory proposed by
Thomas Digges that the foreshore was prima facie in the Crown, and
unless it could be proved to have been granted along with the upland
manor, was presumptively part of the Great Waste.' It was more than
200 years before a court actually held that the foreshore was prima
facie in the Crown,65 and the Crown's attacks on title were almost uni-
versally defeated, either by a showing of such grants as "to the shore"
or continued use.66 But the theory was stated by Hale in De Jure
Maris, along with statements such as the one quoted above, that even
as the grantees of the Crown, thejusprivatum was held subject to the
juspublicum. The public servitude was thus extended to the foreshore,
62. Farnham, supra note 50, at 171.
In both tidal and fresh waters, title to the bed, several (individual) right to fishery, and
the common right to fish were separate rights. If an individual right to take fish were
granted, it was usually in conjunction with title. But this was not necessarily so and each
right could be held by a different person.
63. M. Hale, De Jure Mars, reprinted in Moore, supra note 53, at 377.
64. Moore, supra note 53, at 180. Digges' theory, introduced in 1569 during the reign
of Elizabeth, opened the possibility of adding thousands of acres of waste land to that al-
ready under royal control. No suits had previously been brought by the Crown against the
foreshore except in its capacity as owner of an estate. During Elizabeth's reign, the first of
such claims were made and all of the marshes and foreshore of the country of Kent were
returned to the Crown.
When Charles I ascended to the thrown, title attacks were made upon almost every
susceptible piece of coastal land. Of these suits, it was found only once that ownership was
in the king rather than the owner of the upland.
Charles' claims against the foreshore were one of the reasons for the end of his reign.
Article 26 of the Grand Remonstrance presented to him in 1641 charged him with "the
taking away of men's rights under color of the king's title to land between high and low
water marks." Civil war followed and pending suits against the foreshore were dropped.
Moore, supra note 53, at 180-310.
65. Moore, supra note 53, at 443.
66. Farnham, supra note 50, at 189, 194.
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whether the Crown granted it or not.6 7 And a theoretical rule devel-
oped that demanded recipients of shoreline grants to overcome a pre-
sumption against grants of the foreshore by the Crown.
The most novel and long-lasting idea from this body of law is the
attachment of a public servitude, the ]uspublicum, to a private right-
so attached that it is inalienable and survives future grants. When
courts in the United States began examining the issues of ownership
under water, that concept became an important part of the theory.
The theory affected United States law in other ways. The pre-
sumption against granting of the foreshore was used, in Martin v. Wad-
dell, an early Middle-Atlantic Seaboard case, to decide a point of
English law, namely, whether tidelands had actually been conveyed to
recipients in the New World. As explained below, the Court in Mon-
tana v. United States, citing Martin v. Waddell, misapplied rules of
granting by the English Crown to lands granted by the United States
Government to the Crow Tribe.
C. Tidewater Grants by England on the Eastern Seaboard
The first major United States Supreme Court case involving the
ownership of submerged lands was Martin v. Waddell in 1842.68 It es-
tablished the concept that states hold sovereign ownership in lands be-
neath navigable waters. At issue was whether grants of lands beneath
tidewaters had been made by England before the end of the Revolu-
tionary War. Oyster beds in the Rarita River in New Jersey were
67. Thejuspublicum concept was an ancient one. Suits by the Crown to protect public
interests in navigation and fishery were instituted as early as the Thirteenth Century. The
inalienable burden of public use attached to the land no matter by whom it was owned, king
and subjects alike. But Hale's treatise surely reinforced the notion of a public right to user,
particularly upon foreshore.
In 1959, during the reign of Elizabeth, Thomas Digges introduced a theory that title to
the shore between high and low tide, the "foreshore," was primafacie held by the Crown
and this presumption of sovereign ownership could be overcome by a showing of a defacto
granting by the Crown. Digges' theory opened the possibility of adding thousands of acres
of waste land to that already under royal control.
No suits had previously been brought by the Crown against the foreshore except in its
capacity as owner of an estate. During Elizabeth's reign, the first of such claims were made.
A commission appointed by the Queen, basing its decision purely upon Digges' theory, re-
turned all of the marshes and foreshore of the county of Kent to the Crown.
When Charles I ascended to the throne, title attacks were made upon almost every
susceptible piece of coastal land. Of these suits, it would found only once that ownership
was in the king than the owner of the upland.
Charles' claims against his foreshore were one of the reasons for the end of his reign.
Article 26 of the Grand Remonstrance presented to him in 1641 charged him with "the
taking away of men's rights under color of the kings title to land between high and low water
marks." Civil war followed and pending suits against the foreshore were dropped. Moore,
supra note 53, at 180-310.
68. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367.
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claimed by two parties through separate chains of title. The party in
possession had established an oyster farm on a parcel below high tide,
pursuant to an 1824 act of the New Jersey Legislature setting aside
tracts to be rented for that purpose. An action in ejectment was
brought by one claiming through the original English grant to the area.
In 1664 Charles II granted his brother James, then the Duke of
York, lands later part of New Jersey and New York. The Court found
that James and successive proprietors, as sovereign representatives,
could not under English law make conveyances in tidal lands. New
Jersey, as successive sovereign at the end of the American Revolution,
took the tidal lands unencumbered by a prior grant.
A strong perception of the English concept ofjuspublicum moti-
vated the Court. Under applicable principles of English law which per-
tained to the transaction, the Court found that a presumption against a
granting by the Crown was overcome. A granting to the duke was
definitely intended. But the Court found that concepts of public use of
navigable waters necessitated this granting to have been of sovereignty
only. These lands were to be held as a sovereign for the common use of
all, not as a proprietor. How, it was asked, could thejuspublicum be
served "if the shores, and rivers, and bay, and arms of the sea, and the
land under them, instead of being held as a public trust for the benefit
of the whole community, to be freely used by all for navigation and
fishery, as well as for shellfish and floating fish, had been converted by
the charter itself into private property, to be parcelled out and sold by
the Duke for his own individual emolument? There is nothing we
think in the terms of the letters patent, or in the purposes for which it
was granted, that would justify this construction."69
The court's interpretation did not fit the actual English treatment
of that kind of factual situation. In fact, much land under navigable
waters had been granted to individuals for fisheries.7 ° Private holdings
were subject, of course, to public uses of navigation and fishery.71 But
by rationalizing that private and public uses in the New World were
incompatible, the Court was able to establish that when New Jersey
69. Id. at 413.
70. "Although the king hath primafacde this right in the arms and creeks of the sea
communijure, and in common presumption, yet a subject may have such a right.
And this he may have two ways.
Ist. By the king's charter or grant; and this is without question. The king may grant
fishing within a creek of the sea, or in some known precinct that hath known bounds, though
within the main sea. He may also grant that very interest itself, viz. a navigable river that is
an arm of the sea, the water and soil thereof." M. Hale, De Jure Mars, reprinted in Moore,
supra note 53, at 384.
71. Farnham, supra note 50, at 179.
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assumed a sovereign status at the end of the Revolutionary War, she
took the beds of navigable waters free of any prior grants.
Interestingly enough, after stating its case by finding private grants
within the English system to be inconsistent with the concept of "public
trust," the practical effect of the case was to allow private ownership
sanctioned by the state of New Jersey. Martin v. Waddell established
the concept that states may dispose of lands beneath navigable waters
in any way they wish.
For when the Revolution took place, the people of each state
became themselves sovereign; and in that charter hold the ab-
solute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under
them for their own common use, subject only to the rights
since surrendered by the Constitution to the general govern-
ment. A grant made by their authority must therefore mani-
festly be tried and determined by different principles from
those which apply to grants of the British crown, when the
title is held by a single individual in trust for the whole
nation.72
In reality, the same situation prevailed in England and the United
States. Private ownership in lands beneath navigable waters could be
granted, always subject to the public trust stated in Martin v. Waddell,
"[flor the benefit of the whole community, to be freely used by all for
navigation and fishery. . . .,,7 In the United States, state sovereignty
was subject not only to a public trust in favor of the public, but subject
to federal constitutional servitudes. State and federal roles delineated
in the case derive from the fact that New Jersey took these lands fol-
lowing the Revolutionary War as supreme sovereign prior to the estab-
lishment of a federal system.7 4 It is interesting to contemplate what the
roles of the state and federal government might have been, had the
federal system been established prior to the end of the Revolutionary
War. Perhaps ownership would have been in the federal government.
Federal power was amply protected, however. State sovereignty vested
subject to rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general
government.
For when the Revolution took place, the people of each state
became themselves sovereign; and in that charter hold the ab-
solute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under
them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since
surrendered by the Constitution to the general government.75
Thus, even though the Court dealt with a factual setting in which a
72. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410.
73. Id. at 413.
74. Id. at 410.
75. Id. Emphasis added.
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state took sovereign title as a primary sovereign, adjustments were
made to accommodate the subsequent creation of a federal system.
State rights were subject to federal power.
The rule has suffered from amputation, the words "subject only to
the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general govern-
ment" having often been omitted from recent decisions.
The Court, in Montana v. United States, stated an unusually strong
version of the rule when it said, "The State's power over the beds of
navigable waters remains subject to only one limitation; the paramount
power of the United States to ensure that such waters remain free to
interstate and foreign commerce."" The states surrendered rights to
the federal government beyond commerce powers. And that power ex-
tends beyond ensuring that waters remain free for commerce. For in-
stance, the commerce clause supports Congress' plenary power over
Indians." In United States v. Winans78 that power supported a federal
servitude in favor of Indian treaty rights to fish in off-reservation navi-
gable waters over state-owned lands.
The Court, in Martin v. Waddell, had also stated that rules appli-
cable to the English Crown did not apply to New Jersey. "For when
the Revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves
sovereign. . . . A grant made by their authority must therefore mani-
festly be tried and determined by different principles from those which
apply to grants of the British crown, when the title is held by a single
individual in trust for the whole nation."79
Thus, no presumption against a granting by the sovereign, New
Jersey, was applied against its grantees. English rules applied to Eng-
lish grants and not to those made in a sovereign capacity in the United
States. The Court in Montana v. United States would have done well to
note that distinction when it applied the presumptive rule found inap-
plicable in Martin v. Waddell. This public trust concept, derived from
English law and now applied in the United States, was more clearly
stated in a subsequent Atlantic Seaboard case, Smith v. State of Mary-
76. Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 1251 (1981).
77. The Indian Child Welfare Act reads, in part: "Recognizing the special relationship
between the United States and the Indian tribes and their members and the federal responsi-
bility to Indian people, the Congress finds--(l) that clause 3, section 8, article I of the
United States Constitution [USCU Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3] provides that, 'The Con-
gress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce... with Indian tribes," and, through
this and other constitutional authority, Congress had plenary power over Indian affairs;
(2) that Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course of dealing with Indian
tribes, has assumed the responsibility for the protection and preservation of Indian tribes
and their resources .... " 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1979).
78. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
79. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410, 411.
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land,80 which upheld Maryland's power to legislate against oyster
dredging. This legislative power was found to fall clearly within the
reasons for state sovereignty in lands beneath navigable waters.
This soil is held by the State, not only subject to, but in some
sense in trust for, the enjoyment of certain public rights,
among which is the common liberty of taking fish, as well
shellfish as floating fish. [citations omitted]. The State holds
the propriety of this soil for the conservation of the public
rights of fishery thereon, and may regulate the modes of that
enjoyment so as to prevent the destruction of the fishery. In
other words, it may forbid all such acts as would render the
public right less valuable, or destroy it altogether. This power
results from the ownership of the soil, from the legislative ju-
risdiction of the State over it and from its duty to preserve
unimpaired those public uses for which the soil is held."'
D. Spanish Grants Confirmed by Congress after Alabama Statehood
and Congresional Grants Made Prior to Alabama
Statehood
The next set of cases developed in Mobile, Alabama, the site of
territorial conflicts with Spain. Spain claimed that certain lands, in-
cluding Mobile, had not been ceded by her to France, and could not
have been part of the Louisiana Purchase. Spain continued to control
the area for nine years, and United States courts later determined that
she was without power to make grants during those years.8 2 Congress
subsequently made provision, however, to validate Spanish grants of
that period. 3 Claimants included Pollard, a plantation owner who had
built a wharf in Mobile to facilitate the shipment of lumber products.
Pollard's claim was not recognized because it did not satisfy legislative
restrictions that grants must have been made for purposes of farming or
habitation. 4 When Congress then allowed claimants an opportunity to
reapply, Pollard did so. In 1824 the United States granted river front
land it owned to the city of Mobile, providing that the grant should
affect no claims in the area. No action was taken on Pollard's second
claim and in 1836, by an act of Congress, title was confirmed by his
heirs.8
6
80. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71. See also Den v. The Jersey Co., 15 How. 426.
81. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, 74, 75.
82. Pollard's Lessee v. Files, 2 How. 591.
83. Act of April 25, ch. 67, 2 Stat. 713.
84. Id.
85. Act of May 26, ch. 154, 4 Stat. 39.
86. Act of July 2, 1836, ch. 334, 6 Stat. 680. Title was tenuous, a proviso reading: "This
Act shall only operate as a relinquishment, on the part of the United States, all their right
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Pollard's claim became the source of regular and vigorous litiga-
tion. In Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, his ownership was upheld on the basis
of the exceptions in favor of prior claims in the granting act of 1824 to
Mobile, coupled with the private relief act of 1836.87
Pollard's title was next found good against one claiming under the
1824 United States grant of improved lots to the city of Mobile. 88 That
attack failed because the Court found the claimant had not made re-
quired improvements.
There were broader implications, however, for the development of
the law concerning sovereignty of lands beneath navigable waters. The
Alabama court had continually maintained that the 1824 and 1836 acts
of Congress were void. 9 Alabama had been admitted to the Union in
1819, and the Alabama courts asserted that congressional acts granting
Alabama's submerged tideland after statehood were without effect. Al-
though the Supreme Court decisions were based upon the narrower is-
sues described above, the Alabama courts had raised the major issue
finally decided in Pollard's Lessee .Hagan.9" When that case reached
the Supreme Court the issue was clearly defined: did the federal gov-
ernment have the power to grant submerged tidelands after statehood?
Pollard's lessee brought an action to recover property, asserting his
right through the 1824 act of Congress validating Spanish grants and
1836 act of Congress granting private relief to the Pollard heirs. The
area in question had been under high tide at all times until 1822, and
was thus "navigable" within the meaning of the common law.91
Alabama was formed by means of cession from the state of Geor-
gia pursuant to constitutional powers in the federal government. The
deeds of cession stipulated that when a state should be formed, it
should be admitted into the Congress of the United States on an equal
footing with the original states in all respects.92 The Court interpreted
the deeds of cession as investing the United States government with
powers of eminent domain for the temporary purpose of carrying out
these requirements. 93 Alabama then succeeded to all the rights of "sov-
ereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain" of which Georgia was pos-
and claim to the above described lot of ground, and shall not interfere with or effect the
claim or claims of third persons."
87. 14 Pet. 353. In a subsequent case, City of Mobile v. Emmanuel, I How. 95, one of
the losers in Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, successfully defended a title attack with the same
defense, as the claimant exception to the 1824 Act.
88. Pollard's Lessee v. Files, 2 How. 592.
89. See City of Mobile, 16 Pet. 234, 245-247.
90. 3 How. 212.
91. Id. at 214.
92. Id. at 222.
93. Id. at 223.
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sessed "except so far as this right was diminished by the public lands
remaining in the possession and under the control of the United States,
for the temporary purposes provided for in the deed of cession and the
legislative acts connected with it. Nothing remained to the United
States, according to the terms of the agreement, but the public lands.
94
Rejected was the United States' argument that Alabama had dis-
claimed the tidelands when adopting the following language in the Al-
abama Constitution: "[t]he people inhabiting said territory do agree
and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the waste or
unappropriated land lying within the said territory. . ..",5
The policy reasons for the Court's decision are important. All un-
reserved lands were part of a common fund to be faithfully disposed of
by the federal government for the use and benefit of "all the United
States." 96 Alabama had all rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction and emi-
nent domain, except so far as they were temporarily deprived of the
public lands.97
Finally, stating that any declarations of agreement made between
the states and federal government would be void if inconsistent with
the Constitution of the United States, the Court examined whether
placing state sovereignty in "navigable waters" was contrary to federal
powers to regulate commerce.9" The two were found not inconsistent.
Favorable policy considerations existed for placing sovereignty tide-
lands in the hands of the state.
To give to the United States the right to transfer to a citizen
the title to the shores and soils under the navigable waters,
would be placing in their hands a weapon which might be
wielded greatly to the injury of state sovereignty, and deprive
the states of the powers to exercise a numerous and important
class of police powers.99
Exercise of Alabama's sovereignty was not, in this case, in conflict
with federal prerogatives because "in the hands of the states this power
can never be used so as to effect the exercise of any national right of
eminent domain or jurisdiction with which the United States had been
invested by the Constitution."" For, although the territorial limits of
Alabama have extended all her sovereign power into the sea, it is there,
as on the shore, her municipal power is subject to the Constitution of
the United States, "and the laws which shall be made in pursuance
94. Id.
95. Id. at 224.
96. Id. at 221.
97. Id. at 223.
98. Id. at 229, 230.
99. Id. at 230.
100. Id.
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thereof."''
Recent decisions concerning federal grants prior to statehood have
failed to take the final analytical step of Pollard, that is, to question
whether the powers which accompany state ownership in navigable wa-
ters conflict with any federal powers in those same waters.
The Pollard dispute made one last appearance before the United
States Supreme Court. In Goodtitle v. Kibbe,"°2 the 1836 congressional
act in favor of Pollard's heirs was again asserted as the basis of a claim.
The Court disposed of the case quickly, but added significant dictum.
The case closed with this statement:
Undoubtedly, Congress might have granted this land to the
patentee, or confirmed his Spanish grant, before Alabama be-
came a state. But this was not done and the existence of this
imperfect or inoperative Spanish grant could not enlarge the
power of the United States over the place in question after
Alabama became a state, nor authorize the general govern-
ment to grant or confirm the titles to land when the sover-
eignty and dominion over it had become vested in the state. 103
This dictum became the basis of the Court's decision in the next
Mobile case before the Court, Doe v. Beebe."° Fort Charlotte in Mo-
bile had been abandoned, and Congress, in 1818, one year before Ala-
bama became a state, provided for its disposition through the sale of
lots. In Doe v. Beebe, title of a claimant who had purchased Fort Char-
lotte lots conflicted with that of a party who had been granted a Span-
ish grant in 1806, confirmed by the Congressional Act of 1824.
The Court cited Pollard v. Hagan and rejected any claims based
upon post-statehood acts of Congress. The practical effect of the case
was to uphold, without comment, a grant authorized by Congress
before statehood.
Thus far, the Court's approach was to recognize all authorized
grants to tidelands made prior to statehood. This was succinctly stated
in Smith v. Maryland:10 5
Whatever soil below low-water mark is the subject of exclu-
sive propriety and ownership, belongs to the State on whose
maritime border, and within whose territory it lies, subject to
any lawful grants of that soil by the State, or the sovereign
power which governed its territory before the declaration ofindependence."o
101. Id.
102. Id. at 471.
103. Id. at 478.
104. 9 How. 25.
105. 18 How. 71.
106. Id. at 74.
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The cases agree. In Martin v. Waddell, no prior grants were found
to have been made. Legitimate Spanish grants, those made when Spain
had recognized right to the lands granted, were approved in the Ala-
bama cases. And grants by the United States pre-dating statehood
were honored without question. To that point, the only grants to tide-
lands not accepted by the Court made by a sovereign other than a state,
were Congressional grants made after statehood after sovereignty in
tidelands had vested.
E. San Francisco Tideland Cases and Use of the Public Trust to
Facilitate Commerce
Another tideland area to become the object of controversy was
San Francisco. Weber v. Harbor Commissioners,"°7 decided in 1873,
presents another example of a state-supported trust flowing from state
sovereignty in tidelands. San Francisco v. Le Roy and Knight v. United
States Land Association later interpreted the implications of the trans-
fer of lands held by Spain in trust for municipalities to the United
States. 108
In the Weber case, the first California legislature, by the passage of
the Water-Lot Act,109 granted the City of San Francisco use and occu-
pancy of designated shoreline lots for 99 years. The act also provided
that areas 500 feet beyond the lots granted should be kept clear from
obstruction. The right to regulate construction and improvements to
facilitate shipping and commercial interest was reserved to the state.
Subsequently the legislature established a permanent waterfront line
and allowed the city to construct wharves within that area. The area
beyond the wharves was to remain free from obstruction for the com-
mercial benefit of the "general commerce of the city and the state."" 0
The owner of a lot acquired after the passage of these acts was
found to have no rights to wharf out in derrogation of legislative re-
strictions. Although the court did not specifically peg the state's right
to regulate and enhance commerce to the public trust doctrine, the right
was recognized without question:
Upon the admission of California into the Union upon equal
footing with the original States, absolute property in, and do-
minion and sovereignty over, all soils under the tidewaters
within her limits passed to the State, with the consequent right
to dispose of the title to any part of said soils in such manner
107. 18 Wall. 57.
108. 138 U.S. 656 (1890) and 142 U.S. 161 (1891).
109. Beach and Water-Lot Act, Act of March 26, 1851, Laws of California for 1851, p.
307.
110. 18 Wall. 57, at 67.
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as she might deem proper, subject only to the paramount right
of navigation over the waters, so far as such navigation might
be required by the necessities of commerce with foreign na-
tions or among the several States, the regulation of which was
vested in the General government."'
The decision made an important change in the doctrine's lan-
guage. Citing Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, which had disallowed federal
dispositions of soils beneath tidelands after Alabama statehood, the
Court said: "Although the title to the soil under the tidewaters of the
bay was acquired by the United States by cession from Mexico, equally
with the title to the upland, they held it only in trust for the future
State."' 12
In Pollard, Alabama was instantly created under deeds of cession
from Georgia. In Weber, where the territorial period lasted for four
years, a concept of "holding in trust" had few practical implications.
The statement conjures visions of federal management of the public
domain with one eye on an overriding trust to states. In cases such as
Montana v. United States, however, where statehood was attained 82
years after territorial acquisition from Louisiana, any such principle
must be balanced against the strong powers of the federal government
to deal in an unfettered manner with the public domain and to carry
out trust responsibilities owed to the public as a whole.13
Subsequent cases, San Francisco v. Le Roy, and Knight v. United
States Land Association, dealt with the unique factual situation
presented when sovereignty was transferred from Mexico to the United
States under the Treaty of Guadelupe Hildalgo." 4 Mexico had held
"pueblo lands" in trust for municipalities. At issue was whether this
land vested in San Francisco or the State of California. Ownership in
the City of San Francisco was upheld in both cases upon the theory
that the lands in question were acquired by the United States under a
trust which required a particular disposition.
As to tidelands, although it may be stated as a general princi-
ple-and it was so held in Weber v. Board of Harvard Com-
missioners [citation omitted]-that the title acquired by the
United States to lands in California under tidewaters, from
Mexico, were held in trust for the future state, so that their
ownership and right to disposition passed to it upon its admis-
sion into the Union, that doctrine can not apply to such lands
as had been previously granted to other parties by the former
government, or subjected to trusts which would require their
111. Id. at 65, 66.
112. Id. at 65.
113. National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1879).
114. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Act of Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922.
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disposition in some other way.' 5
The quote, of course, precisely fits the Indian land cases. The
Court first held, in 1831, in the case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,"6
that a trust relationship exists between the federal government and In-
dian tribes. The holding has been the framework for federal legislation
maintaining beneficial ownership of reservation lands in Indian
tribes.'" 7 The decision has also provided precedent for subsequent de-
cisions, such as United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, where the
Court held that a treaty grant to the tribe had bestowed, along with the
land itself, beneficial ownership of all resources and associated prop-
erty interests.""
In Montana v. United States, the lands reserved to the Crow were
subject to a trust that "would require their disposition in some other
way" I19 some way other than holding a portion of those same lands
in trust for the future state of Montana.
F. Extension of the Doctrine to Inland Waters
Until 1876, the doctrine that state sovereignty vests in navigable
waters applied only to tidelands. In that year, in Barney v. Keokuk, 120
the Court held that the doctrine should apply, as well, to inland waters,
reasoning that "the public authorities ought to have entire control of
the great passageways of commerce and navigation, to be exercised for
the public advantage and convenience."'' 2'
At issue in the case was the right of the city of Keokuk to build
wharves and provide easements to railroads below high tide on the
Mississippi River. Riparian owners claimed that their rights precluded
these activities on the city's part.
The Court could have settled the controversy by using applicable
rules of Iowa law. Instead, it upheld the city's activities on another
ground. There was no reason that the rules granting states sovereignty
in the navigable waters of the tidelands should not be extended to the
great rivers.
The Court relied heavily upon the logic of a 1851 case, Genessee
Chiefv. Fitzhugh." That case arose out of a collision on Lake Onta-
rio, and the Court addressed the problem of which forum was appro-
115. San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U.S. 656- 670-71 (1890).
116. 5 Pet. 1.
117. See the Crow Allotment Act, Act of June 3, 1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 751.
118. 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
119. San Francisco v. LeRoy, 138 U.S. 656, 670-71 (1890).
120. 94 U.S. 325 (1876).
121. Id. at 338.
122. Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 3 How. 443.
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priate to decide the case. The congressional act providing for
admiralty jurisdiction in such matters had, up until that time, been ap-
plied only to water navigable by English common law definition-that
is, waters affected by the tide. The Court held that for purposes of
jurisdiction, different rules of navigability should apply in the United
States. Taken into account were the different physiographic conditions
prevalent in England and the United States. In England, ports which
allowed the entry and departure of cargo to facilitate trade with foreign
nations existed only within the tidelands. Streams above that point
were small and unimportant." Different conditions prevailed in the
United States, where jurisdiction was "made to depend upon the navi-
gable character of the water, and not upon the ebb and flow of the
tide." ' 24
It should be noted that Genessee Chief extended concepts of navi-
gability for purposes of jurisdiction only. The decision repeatedly
made this qualification. But the use of this reasoning to extend state
sovereignty over lands beneath navigable inland streams was eminently
sound. The reasons for granting state sovereignty in tidelands-to fa-
cilitate a public trust for purpose of navigation, fishing and com-
merce-was just as appropriate on the Mississippi River as within the
harbors of San Francisco.
As a practical matter, the Barney decision did not affect ownership
of the beds and banks of inland waters. Because states were free to
dispose of this land as they wished, a subsequent stamp by the Court of
state sovereignty in particular lands beneath navigable waters would
simply place United States Supreme Court approval upon the status
quo. The major effect of the decision, then, was to apprise states that
the public trust opportunities and obligations dictated by state-held
sovereignty in navigable waters applied also to states dealing with in-
land waterways. It also apprised the federal government that lands be-
neath waters other than tidelands were, as stated in Weber v. Harbor
Commissioners,125 held in trust for future states.
This brings up an interesting point relative to the Montana v.
United States decision. The treaties between the United States and the
Crow designating certain areas within Wyoming and Montana and,
later, Montana, as an area set aside for Indian use and occupancy were
made in 1851 and 1868. The latter treaty was made eight years before
the United States or the Crow Tribe could have known that there was
any possibility of future state sovereignty in waters affected by the
123. Id. at 451.
124. Id. at 457.
125. 18 Wall. 57.
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treaty. The United States could not have known that it was under an
obligation to hold any inland waters for future states.
And as for treaties with Indians, the creation of Indian Reserva-
tions by executive order, and the creation of federal reserves after 1876,
the date of the Barney v. Keokuk decision, that decision in itself would
not have apprised the federal government that the doctrine would be
extended to any more than the largest interior waterways. The decision
concerned the Mississippi River. And the Court, as part of its ration-
ale, stated that public authorities ought as well to control inland waters
which were "great" passageways of commerce and navigation as
tidelands.' 6
The Court itself had difficulty with extensions of the doctrine be-
yond a river such as the Mississippi. Sixteen years later, after engaging
in the same reasoning process formerly used in Genessee Chief v. Fitz-
hugh and Barney v. Keokuk, the Court specifically extended the doc-
trine of state sovereignty in soils beneath tidelands to the Great Lakes
in the landmark case of Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois.27
One year later, in 1893, in Shively v. Bowlby, 28 the Court first ar-
ticulated the rule that navigability for purposes of title should be ascer-
tained on the basis of whether a body of water was navigable in fact.
Up until that time, the federal government must be excused for any
failure to keep one eye on future state sovereignty when making grants
of lands which encompassed bodies of water of a lesser magnitude than
Lake Michigan or the Mississippi River.
G. Navigability
The extension of the doctrine to inland waters caused the addition
of one new and important dimension to the cases-that of navigability.
When the doctrine was applicable only to tidelands, it was fairly easy
to identify those areas affected by the tides and therefore within the
area of state sovereignty. Few of the early Atlantic, Mexico Gulf or
Pacific Ocean cases dealt with issues of navigability, and if so, the ques-
tion was whether an area was within ordinary high tide, or within an
area which had been subject only to tides caused by extraordinary
weather conditions.'2 9
Nor was the issue of navigability an important one when the bod-
ies of water in question were the Mississippi River or Lake Michigan.
As cases dealt with smaller bodies of inland water, the rather specific
rule of navigability "in fact" was refined. In United States v. Holt State
126. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 325, 338 (1876).
127. Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
128. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
129. United States v. Pacheco, 2 Wall. 587, 590.
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Bank,' 30 a decision which dealt extensively with navigation, the rule
was stated in this manner:
[S]treams or lakes which are navigable in fact must be re-
garded as navigable in law; that they are navigable in fact
when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their
natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce,
over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the
customay modes of trade and travel on water; and further that
navigability does not depend on the particular mode in which
such use is or may be had-whether by steamboat, sailing
vessels or flatboats-nor on an absence of occasional difficul-
ties in navigation, but on the fact, if it be a fact, that the steam
in its natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for
useful commerce.'
31
The result has been that the first question raised in recent cases
concerning possible state sovereignty in lands beneath inland waters
has been that of navigability. If the stream or lake, or a portion of it,
was navigable in fact at the time of statehood, sovereignty vested in the
state. If not, the land in question remained under the control of the
federal government as part of the public domain and was later patenta-
ble to settlers under land disposition acts.
H. Developments in the Public Trust Doctrine
The leading case in the area, Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,1
32
decided in 1892 significantly extended the doctrine by stressing the ob-
ligations of states assuming sovereignty over lands beneath navigable
waters.' 33 The Illinois Legislature had granted around one thousand
acres of reclaimable lands within Lake Michigan to the Illinois Central
Railroad. The case arose because of a subsequent legislative revoca-
tion. The Court held that a grant of that kind was necessarily revok-
able because such a disposition had amounted to an abdication of a
duty to carry out trust responsibilities in favor of citizens.'
34
The Court first found that the doctrine of state sovereignty in lands
beneath navigable waters included Lake Michigan. The reasons for
sovereignty in the state, to support trusts in favor of the people of the
state, were as compelling on Lake Michigan as in tideland areas along
the coasts.' 35
130. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1925).
131. Id. at 56.
132. Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
133. Id. at 353.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 436.
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Next, the Court examined the power of the Illinois Legislature to
make such a disposition of lands held in trust.
That the States hold the title to the lands under navigable
waters of Lake Michigan, within its limits, in the same man-
ner that the State holds title to soils under tide water, by the
common law, we have already shown, and that title necessar-
ily carries with it control over the waters above them when-
ever the lands are subjected to use. But it is a title different in
character from that which the State holds in lands intended
for sale. It is different from the title which the United States
hold in the public lands which are open to preemption and
sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that
they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on com-
merce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed
from the obstruction or interference of private parties. The
interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in
commerce over them may be improved in many instances by
the erection of wharves, docks and piers therein, for which
purpose the State may grant parcels of the submerged lands;
and, so long as their disposition is made for such purpose, no
valid objections can be made to the grants.136
Grants of parcels to enhance commerce, for building wharves, piers
and docks, would have been a "valid exercise of legislative power con-
sistent with the trust to the public upon which such lands are held by
the State.' 37 This case was instead an abdication of control by the
State. 138
Illinois Central Railroad is important because of its strong reitera-
tion of the public trust doctrine. It is more important, however, be-
cause of the decision's presentation of the state's responsibility to
faithfully carry out appropriate trust responsibilities in favor of
citizens.
An interesting aspect of the case is the Court's logic in deciding
that state sovereignty should develop in the lands below Lake Michi-
gan. The Court first found it appropriate that Lake Michigan should
be the object of a public trust in favor of state citizens. From this it
136. Id. at 452.
137. Id. at 453.
138. "The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people
are interested. Like navigable waters and soils under them so as to leave them entirely
under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of parcels mentioned for
the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels can be disposed of
without impairment of the public interest in what remains, than it can abdicate its police
powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace." Id. at 453.
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followed that sovereignty should vest in the state of I1linois.139 Sover-
eignty, therefore, follows the need for sovereignty. The Montana v.
United States decision did not discuss the public trust doctrine. It
would be appropriate when deciding issues of ownership of lands be-
neath navigable waters to use the Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois
analysis. Is it necessary for the state of Montana to uphold trust re-
sponsibilities in favor of its citizens on the Bighorn River flowing
through the heart of the Crow Reservation? If so, sovereignty would
vest. If no such need exists, sovereignty would not vest.
I. Shively v. Bowlby
The 1893 decision of Shively v. Bowlby was a significant one in the
development of the doctrine and has been relied upon heavily in rele-
vant decisions evaluating the power of the federal government to grant
lands beneath navigable water prior to statehood. 40 The Court was
called upon to decide whether general congressional legislation provid-
ing for the settlement of the Oregon Territory had granted the beds and
banks of navigable bodies of water to settlers.
The decision was a comprehensive one. All aspects of the doctrine
were presented and prior decisions were quoted at length. The decision
lacked emphasis, however, and the Court engaged in little analysis.
Bits and pieces of the Shively decision have since been used by the
Court to arrive at the present rule articulated in Montana v. United
States.
Public trust policy considerations, however, were the basis of the
Shively decision, which held that 640 acre tracts for cultivation granted
to settlers under the Act should not include lots within tidelands of the
Columbia River. Unfortunately, later cases involving Indian lands did
not identify the policy reasons related to the public trust doctrine upon
which the Shively decision was based. Nor was it argued in subsequent
cases that policy consideraion consistent with the public trust doctrine
would dictate a different result than that arrived at in Shively.
The Oregon Donation Act of 1850141 made available 640 acre
tracts for settlers in the territory. The Act was designed to populate the
area with small farms, as lands not suitable for cultivation were specifi-
cally exempted from survey. 141
Shively had patented a tract of land under the Act which included
lots extending several hundred feet into the Columbia River. The Ore-
gon Legislature later provided for the disposition of land below high
139. The Court used the same analytical approach when it extended state sovereignty to
lands beneath the Mississippi River in Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 325 (1876).
140. 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
141. Act of September 27, 1850, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 497.
142. Id., Section 3.
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tide for the construction of wharves and piers, some of which was
claimed by Shively. Shively's claim to lands beneath the Columbia
River were held to be unfounded under the Oregon Donation Act.
The decision was grounded on the proposition that the United
States has never "undertaken by general laws to dispose of such
lands."' 143 The Court launched into an exposition of the public trust
concepts as they were conceived in England and applied in the United
States. The section ended with the summation that lands beneath navi-
gable water should "not be disposed of piecemeal to individuals as pri-
vate property, but shall be held as a whole for the purpose of being
ultimately administered and dealt with for the public benefit by the
State, after it shall have become a completely organized
community.' 1
44
The decision makes eminent sense. Small farming settlers re-
ceived no particular benefit from ownership of lands beneath navigable
waters. And any needs settlers would have for fishing, navigation, and
commerce would be provided for by the state.
But the manner in which the Shively decision has been interpreted
by the Court has changed the doctrine of state sovereignty in lands
beneath navigable waters to inhibit grants by the federal government
prior to statehood. 41 The Shively statement that, "Notwithstanding
the dicta contained in some of the opinions of this Court, . . . to the
effect that Congress has no power to grant any land below high water
mark of navigable waters in the Territory of the United, it is evident
that this is not strictly true,"' 146 has often been reiterated in subsequent
opinions. The Court was apparently referring to an earlier remark in
the opinion that the admonitions in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan against
grants of tidelands by the federal government were strong enough to
imply that similar restrictions would apply to grants made prior to
statehood.147 We have seen that this was not true. Dictum in Goodtile
v. Kibbe stated that "undoubtedly Congress might have granted this
land to the patentee, or confirmed his Spanish grant before Alabama
became a State."'148 The Shively decision immediately made that dis-
tinction.' 49 Nevertheless, these hesitancies by the Court in Shively, al-
143. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1893).
144. Id. at 56.
145. Up until the Shively decision, the strongest restriction upon grantings of lands be-
neath navigable waters by the federal government prior to statehood was the statement in
Weber v. Harbor Commissioners that tidewaters acquired by the United States from Mexico
were held in trust for future states. Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57, 65.
146. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47 (1893).
147. Id. at 28.
148. Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 9 How. 71, 76.
149. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47 (1893).
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though they should have been dispelled by equally persuasive but
contradictory language, have changed the Court's approach to federal
grants made prior to statehood.
The language from the Shively decision most often quoted is:
The Congress of the United States, in disposing of the
public lands, has constantly acted upon the theory that those
lands, whether in the interior, or on the coast, above high
water mark, may be taken up by actual occupants, in order to
encourage the settlement of the country; but that the naviga-
ble waters and the soils under them, whether within or above
the ebb and flow of the tide, shall be and remain public high-
ways; and, being chiefly valuable for the public purposes of
commerce, navigation and fishery, and for the improvements
necessary to secure and promote those purposes, shall not be
granted away during the period of territorial government; but,
unless in case of some international duty or public exigency,
shall be held by the United States in trust for the future
States, and shall vest in the several States, when organized
and admitted into the Union with all the powers and preroga-
tives appertaining to the older States in regard to such waters
and soils within their respective jurisdiction. . .'0 [i]n short,
shall not be disposed of piecemeal to individuals as private
property, but shall be held as a whole for the purpose of being
ultimately administered and dealt with for the public benefit
by the State, after it shall have become a completely organ-
ized community.151
This is the key to the decision. The section begins by stating that
Congress has not disposed of lands beneath navigable waters by gen-
eral laws,152 and ends stating that such piecemeal disposals to individu-
als would inhibit administration by the state "for the public benefit
,,153
Treaties with Indians were not "general legislation." Indian trea-
ties are neither legislition or general in nature. They are agreements
between the federal government and Indian tribes taking into account
very specific individual considerations. Nor were the creation of In-
dian reservations piecemeal dispositions to individuals. Tribes were
dealt with as political entities subject to the trusteeship of the federal
government. Later decisions concerning Indian lands are easily distin-
guishable on that basis.
How, then, should agreements concerning Indian lands be recon-
150. Id. at 49-50.
151. Id. at 50.
152. Id. at 48.
153. Id. at 50.
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ciled with Shively? The Shively decision had, once again, as in Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois and Barney v. Keokuk, reasoned from the
necessity to allow states freedom to administer lands beneath navigable
waters for the benefit of citizens of the state.' 54 Private ownership of
such land by settlers deprive the state of this freedom. When dealing
with lands set aside as a place for Indians the first question would be
whether there was a necessity for the state to exercise trusts for the
purposes of fishing, navigation or commerce in favor of its citizens
within that reserved area. Perhaps there would be. If, for instance, the
possibilities of the creation of a major port were foreseen, state sover-
eignty might vest to enable it to carry out trust responsibilities to de-
velop wharves and piers to enhance commerce. But in the more
normal situation which prevailed when an area of country was set aside
for the Crow, no such need existed. Nor were there needs to provide
fishing for white settlers or to protect rights in navigation within a re-
mote area wholly within lands reserved for Indians. State sovereignty
in land beneath the Big Horn River was therefore unnecessary.
The Court decided one other case concerning the extent of patents
issued under the Oregon Donation Act with similar results.' 55 All
other cases involving the doctrine subsequently addressed by the
United States Supreme Court have concerned Indian lands and public
lands. Unfortunately, none of them were approached in that manner.
Public trust aspects of the doctrine have, in fact, completely disap-
peared from the Court's rationale.
J. United States v. Winans and the Federal Servitude
There is precedent for deciding Indian land and public land cases
in another related manner. In United States v. Winans, 56 decided in
1905, state title in lands beneath navigable water was acknowledged by
all of the parties. That title was held to be subject, however, to a fed-
eral servitude in favor of an adjacent Indian tribe.
The case concerned a group of Yakima Indians who had gone
through the familiar procedure of moving to a smaller area of land
after ceding their rights of use and occupancy to surrounding lands to
the United States Government. As part of their treaty with the United
States Government, the Yakimas reserved exclusive rights to fish in one
off-reservation area and the right to fish in common at other off-reser-
vation sites. When members of the Yakima Tribe were prohibited
from fishing in accustomed places on the Columbia River, the United
154. Id.
155. McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70 (1909).
156. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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States Government brought an action to enjoin this prohibition. In de-
fense, it was claimed that when Washington became a state, it assumed
authority to dispose of property over the beds and banks of navigable
streams "subject only to the paramount authority of Congress with re-
gard to navigation. The United States, therefore ...could neither
grant nor retain rights in the shore to the lands under water."' 57
The Court found that a servitude had been imposed by the treaty.
This servitude created rights in the Yakima which were "intended to be
continuing against the United States and its grantees as well as against
the state and its grantees.1
58
This analytical step should be applied after a finding of state sov-
ereignty in navigable waters within an Indian Reservation or public
lands. Even if such sovereignty has been found to exist, is it subject to
a prior federal servitude? This is entirely in keeping with the analysis
of the first major American case to articulate the doctrine as it should
apply in the United States, Martin v. Waddell. State sovereignty in
lands beneath navigable waters is subject to "the rights since surren-
dered by the Constitution to the general government."'' 59 Treaty-cre-
ated federal servitudes in favor of Indians might be slight, such as one
in favor of religious sites. Or they might be of such dimension as to
preclude any rights or obligations in the state. In that case, the state
would be the holder of naked title, entirely subject to preemptive fed-
eral servitudes.
K. An Introduction to the Indian Land Cases
The United States Supreme Court has heard six cases since 1912
which decided state ownership of lands beneath navigable waters. Two
of these, Donnellf v. United States 60 and United States v. Oregon,' 6'
decided in 1912 and 1934, concerned United States dispositions of the
public domain after statehood. In Donnelly, where an Indian reserva-
tion had been created by executive order after California statehood,
and in United States v. Oregon, where a federal bird refuge had been
created, again by executive order subsequent to Oregon statehood, the
federal issue was navigability. If the bodies of water in question had
not been navigable at the time of statehood, they remained part of the
public domain and were subject to a federal disposition. If they were
navigable, the lands beneath these waters vested in California and Ore-
gon at statehood and under the rule of Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan were
157. Id. at 382-83.
158. Id. at 381-82.
159. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410.
160. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
161. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1934).
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not subject to subsequent federal grants. The question of the ability of
the federal government to dispose of the lands beneath these waters
during the territorial period prior to statehood was not at issue and
subsequent reliance by the Court upon these cases should be read with
that caveat. 62
The remaining four cases decided by the Court have all concerned
Indian lands. In one of these Brewer Oil Co. v. United States,'63 de-
cided in 1922, a portion of the Arkansas River was found not to have
been navigable at the time of Oklahoma statehood. Whether there had
been a pre-statehood disposition by the federal government was, there-
fore, not reached.
Thus, only three Indian land cases have gone beyond the issue of
navigability and reached the question of possible federal disposition of
lands beneath navigable waters prior to statehood. Of these, United
States v. Holt State Bank, 164 a 1925 case, concerned the Minnesota
Chippewas; Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma,165 decided in 1969, adjudi-
cated rights of Oklahoma tribes; and Montana v. United States,166 de-
cided this year, adjudicated rights of the Montana Crow Tribe.
Of the four cases cited since 1912 deciding whether a federal grant
had been made prior to statehood, the first three involved lands no
longer part of a reservation. In Brewer Oil Co. v. United States and
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, reservation status had terminated in
1906.167 The land in question in United States v. Holt State Bank had
not been part of an Indian reservation for 36 years. In all of these cases
the United States Government was under a duty to dispose of these
lands in trust for designated tribes. Montana v. United States was not
only the first case evaluating federal grants prior to statehood that
found state ownership of land within an ongoing, functioning Indian
reservation, it was the first such case before the Court where such an
outcome was even possible.
Another way to analyze these cases as a whole is this: Of the In-
dian cases evaluating a federal disposition prior to statehood, a federal
grant was found in favor of only the Coctaw and Chickasaw tribes.
The federal government had moved these tribes from their aboriginal
homes to a new area. In those cases in which tribes were within their
aboriginal area and their treaty with the federal government involved
162. The Montana v. United States decision cited United States v. Oregon. Montana v.
United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 1251 (1981).
163. Brewer Oil Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
164. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1925).
165. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1969).
166. Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981).
167. Act of April 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137.
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their ceding surrounding territory and retaining their rights of use and
occupancy to that area, which remained a federal disposition of lands
beneath navigable waters to the tribe prior to statehood was not found.
The Court apparently has trouble understanding the concept of owner-
ship in Indian lands it first articulated in the case of Worcester v. Geor-
gia. 6  The Court may not be able to conceputalize the most usual
kind of Indian treaty in which a tribe cedes surrounding land, reserving
rights of use and occupancy to everything else. This sort of treaty, of
course, will not contain precise granting language from the federal gov-
ernment to the tribe because nothing is being granted. The tribe is re-
taining that which it previously controlled.
Not only will the Court's present conveyancing rules tend to favor
tribes which have been moved from aboriginal lands, such a movement
will be seen by the Court as a hardship creating an "exigency" facilitat-
ing the finding of a federal grant.169 The result is an unfair application
in favor of Indian tribes which happen to have been moved from their
aboriginal lands by the federal government. In fact, if Montana v.
United States is followed, tribes with those kinds of historical back-
grounds may be the only ones able to retain ownership of the beds and
banks of navigable waters.
The remainder of this section will emphasize United States v. Holt
State Bank and Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma-the two cases prior to
Montana v. United States which found the waters involved to be navi-
gable and went on to find whether beneficial ownership had been
placed in the tribe prior to statehood. The cases were decided using
radically different approaches. The Choctaw case construed the rele-
vant treaties between the Choctaws and the United States using the
usual rules viewing the language as it would have been viewed by the
participating Indian tribe. 17 Holt State Bank, on the other hand, using
isolated language from the Shively decision, applied conveyancing
rules to federal grants made prior to statehood. The Court in Montana
v. United States, following the Holt decision, has created conveyancing
rules of extreme stringency particularly inappropriate to the Indian
land cases. Aspects of the Public Trust Doctrine have been completely
ignored in all of the cases since 1912.
168. Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515.
169. The rule was well stated in United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1904):
"[W]e will construe a treaty with the Indians as 'that unlettered people' understood it, and
'as justice and reason demand in all cases where power is exerted by the strong over those to
whom they owe care and protection,' and counterpoise the inequality 'by the superior justice
which looks only to the substance of the right without regard to technical rules.' 1 119 U.S.
1; 175 U.S. I. How the treaty in question was understood may be gathered from the
circumstances."
170. Brewer Oil Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
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L. United States Supreme Court Cases Between 1912 and 1969
1. Brewer Oil Co. v. United States
Of the block of cases after 1912 deciding the issue of whether a
federal grant was made prior to statehood in land beneath navigable
waters, Brewer Oil Co. v. United States, United States v. Holt State
Bank, Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, and Montana v. United States-
the first, the Brewer case, was decided on the issue of navigability. The
body of water in question was found non-navigable at the time of state-
hood and therefore the issue of whether the federal government had
made a grant of lands beneath navigable waters was not met.
The case is of some importance, however. The Montana v. United
States decision follows dictum in the case stating the logical steps to be
used when going beyond the issue of navigability. The case also raises
an interesting idea about determining the intention of the parties to a
federal disposition in relation to the circumstances that existed at the
time.
In Brewer, the United States Government brought an action to
quiet title to a portion of bed of the Arkansas River which the state of
Oklahoma was leasing to various oil companies. 7 ' It was the United
States' claim that this portion of the Arkansas River had been granted
by treaty to the Osage Indians 35 years prior to Oklahoma statehood.
Osage trust funds had been used to purchase a portion of what was
later Oklahoma from the Cherokee Tribe. The treaty delineated the
boundary of the Osage Reservation as the mid-channel of the Arkansas
River. Oklahoma argued that the Arkansas was navigable at this point
and that the United States Government had no power to grant lands
beneath navigable waters prior to statehood. The portion of the Ar-
kansas in question was found non-navigable and the Court, therefore,
was not required to decide whether the federal government had, in fact,
granted any of it to the Osage Tribe.
If the Arkansas River were navigable in the fact at the locus
in quo, the unrestricted power of the United States when ex-
clusive sovereign, to part with the bed of such a stream for
any purpose, asserted by the Circuit Court of Appeals would
be before us for consideration. If that could not be sustained,
a second question would arise whether vesting ownership of
the river bed in the Osages was for "a public purpose appro-
priate to the objects for which the United States hold
territory."'1
72
Thus, the Court in dictum stated how it would approach the prob-
171. Id. at 85.
172. Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 1253 (1981).
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lem had the river, in fact, been navigable. After deciding whether the
United States had the power to make such a grant, the Court would
have inquired whether the grant was for an appropriate purpose. The
Montana v. United States decision appears to depend upon that logical
pattern. The Montana court asked first whether the imposed presump-
tion against grantings by the sovereign had been overcome. It then said
the next inquiry should be whether the grant satisfied an "appropriate
public purpose" presented by a "public exigency" existing at the time
of the grant. 73 The Brewer test of a purpose appropriate to the objects
for which the United States hold a territory, and the additional test in
Montana v. United States that it be made to satisfy an existing public
exigency, are both conjectural in that neither court applied them. In
Brewer this language was dictum. The Court stated that it was not
called upon to consider these issues. And in the Montana case, because
the Crow Tribe was found not to have overcome a presumption against
granting by the sovereign, there was no need to impose these additional
hurdles. Nevertheless this shows the Court's willingness to build upon
dictum when deciding questions of state sovereignty in lands beneath
navigable waters.
The Brewer decision also raised an interesting point relating to
navigability and the intention of the parties participating in a federal
disposition prior to statehood. The power of the federal government to
deal with non-navigable waters was unquestioned.
The title of the Indians grows out of a federal grant when the
federal government had complete sovereignty over the public
lands in the condition of ownership as they were then, and if
the bed of a navigable stream had then become the property
of the Osages, there was nothing in the admission of
Oklahoma into a constitutional equality of power with other
states which required or permitted a divesting of the title.174
Because the river was non-navigable and presumably appeared
non-navigable, the Court found that it would be Congress' intention to,
convey it to the Osage, knowing that there was no policy to hold it in
trust for a future state. 7 The idea omits some important points. The
treaty with the Osage was signed on March 3, 1873. The first decision
stating that the United States holds the lands beneath navigable waters
in trust for future states, Weber v. Board of Harbor Commissioners,17 6
was decided later that year. Congress could not have known of any
possible differences in policy between navigable and non-navigable wa-
173. Brewer Oil Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 88 (1922).
174. Id. at 86-87.
175. Weber v. The Board of Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57.
176. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1925).
19811
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW[
ters. Before 1876, when the doctrine of state sovereignty in lands be-
neath navigable waters was first extended to inland waters, Congress
could not have been thinking about the doctrine in relation to inland
waters.
The Court's approach in Brewer is important, however, in finding
that the intention of the parties to a treaty agreement should be viewed
in accordance with conditions that existed at the time.
2. United States v. Holt State Bank
The next case to articulate the doctrine was United States v. Holt
State Bank.'7 7 The case decided the ownership of lands which had
once been part of the Chippewa Red Lake Reservation. 78 In 1855, the
Minnesota Chippewa, as part of a treaty with the United States Gov-
ernment, ceded all their lands within the territory of Minnesota.'79
Also as part of the treaty, specific lands were reserved for the Chippe-
was.180 Minnesota subsequently become a state in 1858.181
Further cessions of land were made by the Chippewa by treaty in
1889.182 The United States was to dispose of that territory ceded and
hold the proceeds in trust for the benefit of the Chippewa bands.18 3
Lands were to be designated as pine land or agricultural land and dis-
posed of accordingly. Pine lands were to be logged under regulations
specified in the treaty and the Chippewa were to be paid $1.25 an acre
for the disposal of agricultural land opened to homesteading. 8 4 No
provision was made to pay tribe members for lands not classified as
either agricultural or pine lands.
Much of the land ceded by the Chippewas was marshy. In 1906,
Congress authorized a survey of the area with the aim of draining suit-
able portions."8 5 Over half of the cost of the survey was provided by
funds held in trust for the Chippewa." 6
Mud Lake, comprising nearly 5,000 acres, was drained in 1910 and
177. It is stated in Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 1251 (1981): "The lake lay
wholly within the boundaries of the Red Lake Indian Reservation, which had ben created
by treaties entered into before Minnesota joined the Union." This is incorrect. Mud Lake
was part of an area ceded by the Chippewa(s) to the United Stats 36 years before the case
was decided.
178. Treaty with the Chippewa, Act of February 22, 1855, Ch. 204, 10 Stat. 686.
179. Id., Article 2.
180. Act of May 11, 1858, Ch. 31, 11 Stat. 285.
181. Act of January 14, 1889, Ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642.
182. Id., Article 7.
183. Id.
184. Act of June 21, 1906, Ch. 3504, 34 Stat, 325, 352.
185. Supplemental brief for United States at 11, United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S. 49 (1925).
186. Id. at 3, 4.
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1911 and opened to homesteading.' 87 Two years later, in a friendly suit
to delineate the extent of ownership of a party who had been a riparian
owner of Mud Lake, it was held, in a state court proceeding, that Mud
Lake was navigable under principles of Minnesota law, and further,
that applicable Minnesota law placed ownership of the bed of the for-
mer lake in its riparian owners, excluding the possibility of ownership
in recent homsteaders. The case reached the United States Supreme
Court in 1922.
The high court's decision reiterates the general rules pertaining to
the doctrine. Navigability for purpose of title is a federal question to
be determined by applicable federal rules. And streams are navigable
in law when they are navigable in fact. That is, when they "are used, or
are susceptible of being used, in their natural condition, as highways
for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in
the customary modes of trade and travel on water .. 188
The United States claimed that Mud Lake had never been naviga-
ble. In the alternative, it was argued that Mud Lake had always be-
longed to the Chippewa.' 89 Under the principles announced in
Worcester v. Georgia, they held absolute title to lands they used and
occupied, subject only to a right of purchase by the United States and a
prohibition against its sale to any other party. 9°
The Court found that Mud Lake had been navigable before it was
drained. In examining the possibility of a federal grant of the lake to
the Chippewa prior to Minnesota statehood, the Court started with the
proposition that states own lands beneath navigable waters
subject to the paramount power of Congress to control such
waters for the purpose of navigation in commerce among the
States and with foreign nations, and subject to the qualifica-
tion that where the United States after acquiring the territory
and before the creation of the State, has granted rights in such
lands by way of performing international obligations, or ef-
fecting the use or improvement of the lands for the purposes
of commerce among the States and with foreign nations, or
carrying out other public purpose appropriate to the objects
for which the territory was held, such rights are not cut off by
the subsequent creation of the State, but remain unimpaired,
and the rights which otherwise would pass to the State in vir-
187. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1925).
188. Brief for United States at 17, 18, United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49
(1925). The United States Court could have argued a granting to the Chippewa. The treaty
provided for a comprehensive cession by the Chippewa to the United States followed by a
granting to the Chippewa. Treaty with the Chippewa, Act of February 22, 1855, ch. 284,
Articles 1 and 2, 10 Stat. 686.
189. Id. at 20, 21.
190. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1925).
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tue of its admission into the Union are restricted or qualified
accordingly. 91
The Court immediately qualified this, however, by saying that, as
stated in Shively v. Bow/by, because the United States has adhered to a
general policy of holding lands under navigable waters
for the ultimate benefit of future States, and so has refrained
from making any disposal thereof, save in exceptional in-
stances when impelled to particular disposal by some interna-
tional duty or public exigency . . . . [It followed that]
disposals by the United States during the territorial period are
not lightly to be inferred, and should not be regarded as in-
tended unless the intention was definitely declared or other-
wise made very plain.92
The Shively language nowhere approached this in tone. And, as
we have seen, a finding that Shively owned no portion of the tidelands
of the Columbia River was made, not because the grant was not "defi-
nitely declared or otherwise made very plain," but because such owner-
ship would have conflicted with state duties to administer this land to
properly carry out trust responsibilities toward its citizens. The Shively
Court's first statement, by way of conclusion, read,
Lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or im-
provement in the manner of lands above high water mark.
They are of great value to the public for the purposes of com-
merce, navigation and fishery. Their improvement by indi-
viduals, when permitted, is incidental or subordinate to the
public use of the right. Therefore the title and the control of
them are vested in the sovereign of the benefit of the whole
people.' 93
When considering the 1855 treaty between the United States and
the Chippewa(s), the Holt State Court stated, "An affirmative disposal
is not asserted."' 9 4 That was correct. The United States, in its brief,
had not argued that a grant had been made by the federal government
to the Chippewa(s), but that the land had always belonged to the Chip-
pewa bands prior to its cession to the United States. The Court in Mon-
tana v. United States made the same sort of complaint when denying a
federal disposition in favor of the Crow Tribe. The Court said the 1851
treaty represented a covenant between the Tribe and the United States
Government, rather than a formal conveyance. And the 1868 treaty
expressed no clear intention to convey the riverbed.' 95 The Court's de-
191. Id. at 55.
192. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1893).
193. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1925).
194. Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 1252 (1981).
195. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 58 (1925).
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mand that treaties between the federal government and Indian tribes
must be in the form of grants by the federal government, and its con-
comitant dismissal of agreements which instead constitute reservations
by Indian tribes, is not only arbitrary, but appallingly arrogant. It is
the Court's place to interpret Congress' intercourse with Indian tribes,
not dictate the form of that intercourse.
The Holt State Court may have been considering possible claims
by the Chippewa(s) against the federal government. This was said:
If the reservation operated as a disposal of the lands under a
part of the navigable waters within its limits it equally worked
a disposal of the lands under all. Besides Mud Lake, the res-
ervation limits included Red Lake, having an area of 400
square miles, the greater part of the Lake of the Woods, hav-
ing approximately the same area, and several navigable
streams. 1
96
The treaty of 1897 dictating the disposal of these ceded lands, however,
provided only for payments to the Chippewa for monies derived from
the sale of pine lands and agricultural lands. They were promised no
compensation for ceded lands not of those descriptions.
The finding of navigability in United States v. Holt State Bank
warrants some discussion. The facts in Holt State Bank are very close
to those in another case, United States v. Oregon, 197 with differing re-
sults. A determination of navigability is, in itself, somewhat subjective,
despite the clarity of the rule that waters navigable in fact are navigable
in law.
In wetter years, Mud Lake could be navigated in a gasoline
launch, if shallow areas were avoided.' 98 In seasons of drought, the
lake could be crossed with a team and wagon. 99 An area of water was
found non-navigable in United States v. Oregon although it was trav-
ersed frequently with gasoline-powered boats. In the Oregon case, the
United States claimed that a bird refuge created by executive order in
1908, 49 years after Oregon statehood, was made up entirely of land
beneath non-navigable water which had remained part of the public
domain at the time of statehood. In both United States v. Holt State
Bank and United States v. Oregon, a different finding of navigability by
the Court would have resulted in possible claims against the United
States Government.
196. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1934).
197. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1925).
198. Brief for United States, at 5, United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1925).
199. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1969).
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3. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma
The next case deciding whether state sovereignty in lands beneath
navigable waters vested subject to prior grants by the federal govern-
ment was Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma,2" a 1969 case. The case was
decided upon entirely different principles than those relied upon in
United States v. Holt State Bank. The ruling principles were those of
Indian law-treaties, requiring that they be read as they would have
been read by participating Indians at the time the agreement was made.
The controversy addressed in the case was essentially the same as
that in Brewer Oil Co. v. United States. The Choctaw and Cherokee
Nations attacked the issuance of oil leases by the river of Oklahoma on
lands beneath the steambed of the Arkansas River. The state claimed
ownership in the area in question, and argued that its sovereignty had
vested at the time of Oklahoma statehood in 1906.201 The navigability
of the river was apparently unquestioned. It was held that the lands
granted to these Indian groups prior to statehood had included lands
beneath the Arkansas River.
The history of the United States' dealings with the Choctaw and
Cherokee Nations was considered at length.2"2 These Indians, who had
originally inhabited the southeastern and southern United States, had
been persuaded to move to Arkansas. After treaties had been entered
into, ceding lands in Georgia and Mississippi and reserving lands in
Arkansas, the United States was forced to concede that a move to Ar-
kansas would be impossible. That area was already heavily settled. It
would, instead, be easier to relocate these groups in advance than to
attempt to move entrenched white settlers from Arkansas.
Those Indians who had decided to assume agricultural existences
in Georgia and Mississippi, with the consent of the United States Gov-
ernment, were also in peril. Both of those states passed legislation ex-
tending their jurisdiction over Indians and made preparations to
distribute lands they held under the protection of the federal govern-
ment. Again, moving the affected Indians was seen as preferable to a
clash with white citizens.
Thus, through the treaties of Dancing Rabbit Creek with the
Choctaws in 1830,201 and the New Echota with the Cherokees in
200. Act of June 16, 1906, §§ 3, 4, 34 Stat. 270, 271.
201. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma 397 U.S. 620, 622-27 (1969).
202. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Act of September 27, 1830, 7 Sat. 333.
203. Treaty of New Echota, Act of December 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478. The Chicasaw re-
ceived an interest in portions of land belonging to the Choctaws under treaties of January
17, 1837, 11 Stat. 573 and June 22, 1855, 11 Stat. 611.
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1835,204 agreements were made to provide these groups with new
homes in Oklahoma. The lands granted were to be patented in fee
simple and were never to be part of a state or territory.
Pressure from settlers again caused the final termination of tribal
affairs205 and the subsequent formation of the state of Oklahoma. Indi-
vidual Indians were granted allotments,20 6 and the United States gov-
ernment was charged with selling remaining lands in trust for then
members of the tribes.20 7 Lands not yet sold were to be held in trust for
the use and benefit of terminating tribes.208 The land in conflict was
unaflotted, unsold land held by the United States under this trust
obligation.
The Court found that the agreements under which the affected
tribes had moved to Oklahoma were not ordinary exercises in
conveyancing.
The Indian Nations did not seek out the United States and
agree upon an exchange of lands in an arm's-length transac-
tion. Rather, treaties were imposed upon them and they had
no choice but to consent. As a consequence, this Court has
often held that treaties with the Indians must be interpreted as
they would have understood them, see, e.g., Jones v. Meehan,
175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899), and any doubtful expressions in them
should be resolved in the Indian's favor.20 9
In answer to assertions that the logic of the Holt State Bank deci-
sion should apply, it was stated that "[I]t seems well settled that the
United States can dispose of lands underlying navigable waters just as
it can dispose of other public lands. See, Shive/y v. Bow/by, 152 U.S. 1,
47-48 (1894). Rather, the question is whether the United States in-
tended to convey title to the river bed to petitioners."'2 10 Nothing in the
204. Act of June 28, 2898, Ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495. Act of July 1, 1902, Ch. 1375, 32 Stat.
716.
205. Act of April 26, 1906, Ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137.
206. Id., Section 16.
207. Id., Section 27. Section 27 reads, in part: "that the lands belonging to the Choc-
taw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, of Seminole Tribes, upon the dissolution of said tribes,
shall not become public lands nor property of the United States, but shall be held in trust by
the United States for the use and benefit of the Indians respectively comprising each of said
tribes. .. ."
208. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1969). The Court did engage
in some common sense boundary interpretation. The treaty read "up the Arkansas" and
"down the Arkansas." This was contemporaneously framed in the patent as "down the
main channel of the Arkansas." That portion of the river within the area reserved was
considered to be, without discussion, "within the metes and bounds of the treaty grants to
petitioners."
209. Id. at 633. To the assertion by counsel that governmental purpose to convey away
the bed of a navigable river is "not lightly to be inferred," Douglas in.a concurring opinion
said, "such exceptional circumstances are present here."
210. Id. at 634.
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Holt State Bank opinion required the Court to blind itself to "the cir-
cumstances of the grant in determining the intent of the grantor."2"
In addition, the fact that affected Indian Nations had been granted
land in fee simple and were promised that "no part of the land grant to
them shall ever be embraced in any Territory or State" aided the Court
in its conclusion that the United States intended to grant those portions
of the Arkansas River within and contiguous to reserved lands to In-
dian Nations, rather than hold them for future states.
212
The dissent relied rather heavily on principles and cases only pe-
ripherally related to the doctrine. These cases, Packer v. Bird213 and
Railroad Co. v. Shurmeier,21 4 were mentioned in the Shively decision
and were again referred to in Montana v. United States. In Packer v.
Bird the Court had ruled that while the question of navigability was a
federal one, the incidents of ownership attaching to a federal grant to
the banks of a navigable steam were to be decided by local law.
In Railroad Co. v. Schurmeier, the question was whether a federal
grant on the shores of the Mississippi should extend to the meander
line or the banks of the river. The Court was called upon to interpret
surveying laws dating back to 1796. The act, and subsequent acts, read
that surveys should be made to the banks of navigable streams for the
reason that all navigable streams should remain public highways.21 5
These acts were in line with English ideas about public use-that
certain rivers, although owned by private riparian owners, were subject
to thejuspublicum of navigation in favor of the English people. Con-
gress, when passing such legislation, had navigational servitudes in
mind, and was not prospectively determining whether states should or
should not have title to the beds of navigable waters. The issue of state
sovereignty in tidelands was not met by the Court until Martin . Wad-
dell, decided in 1842.216 The Packer case is important to the doctrine
in again stating that the states are free to dispose of lands beneath navi-
gable waters in whatever manner they please. Aspects of these cases
which refer to congressional policy not to survey navigable waters re-
late, however, to an intention to preserve a navigational servitude in
favor of citizens as a whole and any reliance upon them to show a
congressional policy in favor of holding lands beneath navigable waters
for future states is misplaced.
211. .d. at 635.
212. Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1890).
213. Railroad Co. v. Schurmeier, 74 U.S. 272 (1868).
214. The first such act was the Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 29, § 9, 1 Stat. 468.
215. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367.
216. Knight v. United States Land Association, 142 U.S. 161 (1891).
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IV. MONTANA V. UNITED STATES
This section will discuss first the presumption against a granting by
the United States Government applied by the Court. The words "by
the United States Government" are used because the Court has not
decided a case involving a grant by another sovereign since the case of
Knight v. United States Land Association in 189 1,17 and it is highly
unlikely that it will meet such a case again. The cases before the Court
since 1892, and the cases that it will continue to meet, involve grants by
the United States Government made during the territorial period.
Again, recent cases have all involved grants by the United States Gov-
ernment, or the retention by Indians, of large blocks of land reserved
for Indians, and, in one case, a reservation, after statehood, of a large
area to be used as a federal bird refuge. The conflicts before the Court
are federal-state conflicts and the issue is the power of the federal gov-
ernment, in its active management of the public domain prior to state-
hood, to dispose freely of that domain for the benefit of the general
public, or whether it was inhibited in that disposal by a duty to hold
lands beneath navigable waters for future states.
Second, this section will discuss the power of the Court to apply
rules developed in the twentieth century affecting those transactions-
rules which had to have been known to the parties at the time of the
transactions in order to meet the present requirements of the Court. Is
the Court acting properly by demanding that grants and reservations
made during the territorial period should now have a different meaning
than the parties have always assumed them to have had, because they
do not now meet requirements the parties could not have known of at
the time the transaction was made?
A. The Presumption Against Granting
When deciding Montana v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court had, as precedent, two conflicting cases. One that went
beyond the issue of navigability, United States v. Holt State Bank, and
determined whether Minnesota assumed statehood subject to prior
grants of land beneath navigable waters, applied conveyancing rules to
a federal grant. In that case, a grant was not found to have been made
to the Chippewa Indians. The Montana v. United States Court could
also have followed the reasoning used in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma
and decided the case using principles of Indian law. In finding that the
United States had not granted the bed of the Big Horn River to the
Crow Tribe prior to Montana statehood in 1895, the Court chose to
follow United States v. Holt State Bank. It, in fact, extended the con-
217. Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 1251 (1981).
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veyancing rules previously applied in that case and made one signifi-
cant change in the doctrine. The Court, for the first time in any United
States Supreme Court decision, required the grantee of a federal grant
to overcome a presumption against a granting by the United States
Government prior to statehood. There follow quotes from the opinion.
A court deciding a question of title to the bed of the navigable
water must, therefore, begin with a strong presumption
against conveyance by the United States. United States v. Or-
egon, supra, 295 U.S. at 14, and must not infer such a convey-
ance "unless the intention was definitely declared or
otherwise made plain." United States v. Holt State Bank,
supra, 270 U.S. at 55, or was rendered in "clear and special
words," Martin v. Waddell, supra, 41 U.S. at 411, or "unless
the claim confirmed in terms embraces the land under the wa-
ters of the stream." Packer v. Bird, supra, 137 U.S. at 672.2
When measured against this standard, it was found that the Crow
treaties failed to overcome the presumption. The 1851 treaty did not by
its terms formally convey any land to the Indians at all, but instead
chiefly represented a covenant among several tribes which recognized
specific boundaries for their respective territories. It referred to hunt-
ing and fishing only insofar as it said that the Crow Indians "do not
surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing or passing over any of the
tracts of country heretofore described," a statement that had no bearing
on ownership of the riverbed. By contrast, the 1868 treaty did expressly
establish a territory for the Crow Tribe. Article 2 of the treaty de-
scribed the reservation land in detail and stated that such land would
be "set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of
the Indians herein named. .. ." The treaty then stated:
[T]he United States now solemnly agrees that no persons, ex-
cept those herein designated and authorized to do so, and ex-
cept such officers, agents, and employees of the government as
may be authorized to enter upon the Indian reservations in
discharge of duties enjoined by law, shall ever be permitted to
pass over, settle upon, or reside in the territory described in
this article for the use of said Indians. . . . Whatever prop-
erty rights the language of the 1868 treaty created, however,
its language is not strong enough to overcome the presump-
' 219
tion against the sovereign's conveyance of the riverbed.
The treaty did not expressly refer to the riverbed, nor express an inten-
tion to convey the riverbed in "clear and special words," or by lan-
gjiage "definitely declared or otherwise made plain. 220
218. Id. at 1252.
219. Id.
220. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
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In documenting the existence of such a presumption, the Montana
v. United States Court cited United States v. Oregon .221 The presump-
tion language in the Oregon case was made as part of the general state-
ment of law leading to a discussion of navigability where it was found
that marshlands reserved by Executive Order were non-navigable and
had remained part of the public domain when Oregon became a state.
The Oregon Court's entire reference was a quote from Massachusetts v.
New York referring to a presumption against a state's divesting itself of
sovereignty in navigable waters. The quote read:
Dominion over navigable waters and property and the soil
under them are so identified with the sovereign power of gov-
ernment that a presumption against their separation from sov-
ereignty must be indulged, in construing either grants by the
sovereign of the lands to be held in private ownership or
transfer of sovereignty itself?
22
Massachusetts v. New York, concerned the interpretation of the
Treaty of Hartford, made between Massachusetts and New York in
1786. Both states had claimed much of the same territory of western
New York. They settled their differences by agreeing that New York
should have sovereignty to the area, and Massachusetts should be paid
the proceeds of sales of public domain. The Court found that "the
proper construction of the technical language of the treaty [which both
granted and reserved to New York the right and title of sovereignty
and jurisdiction over the area described] gave to New York, as incident
to its sovereignty, title to all lands under navigable waters. 22 3
The case relied, as well, on the principles stated in Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois.224 A state, which it can, under the rule of Martin v.
Waddell, grant proprietary ownership in lands beneath navigable wa-
ters, cannot in so doing inhibit its own ability to carry out trust respon-
sibilities to further navigation, commerce and fishing in favor of its
citizens. A grant of sovereignty in lands beneath navigable waters
would certainly be in derogation of such a trust responsiblity. Massa-
chusetts v. New York is within that line of cases inhibiting a state's
relinquishment of its trust responsibilities.
Should such an inhibitation against a divestment by a state of sov-
ereignty be used against the United States in the context of Montana v.
United States? It should not, for the reason that the responsibilities of
the federal government are to the general public, and not to the citizens
of the state to protect their rights in fishing and navigation.
221. Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65, 89 (1926).
222. Id. at 81.
223. Id. at 90.
224. Massachusetts v. New York 271 U.S. 65, 88 (1926).
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The English system was two-tiered. Sovereignty in navigable wa-
ters was in the Crown subject to uses in favor of the general public.
When this was transferred to the United States, a four-tier system de-
veloped. Sovereignty was placed in the states with an obligation to up-
hold a trust in favor of the citizens of the state. At the same time, this
was subject to paramount constitutional powers in the federal govern-
ment in favor of general citizens. The federal government has no obli-
gations to uphold a trust to enhance fishing and navigation in favor of
citizens of a state. It has, however, constitutional powers to manage the
public domain and carry out trust responsibilities in favor of Indians.
As a general proposition, the application of a presumption against
granting a land beneath navigable water prior to statehood places the
protection of states' interest ahead of conflicting constitutional powers
in favor of the general public-an impermissible demand upon the fed-
eral government. The effect is an extension of the equal footing doc-
trine to vest state sovereignty in navigable waters at the time territories
are formed, rather than at the time of statehood.
And even if a presumption against granting of lands beneath navi-
gable waters were applied to a sovereign other than a state, to which
sovereign, in this case, would the rule apply? The sovereigns engaging
in treatying were the Crow and the United States Government. The
Crow were ceding land while the United States was purchasing the
land ceded. Lands retained by the Crow were "set apart" for their un-
disturbed use and occupancy. It is natural to infer that, in the context,
should a presumption against granting be applied, or, as stated in Mas-
sachusetts v. New York, should a presumption against separation from
sovereignty be applied, the affect would be that the Crow did not divest
themselves of sovereignty to lands beneath navigable waters in those
lands retained.
Finally, a presumption against grants by the sovereign would pre-
sumably develop for the protection of that sovereign. If, as it is pre-
sumed by the Court, the United States is the sovereign, the application
of the rule in Montana v. United States defeats the sovereign and the
general public. This illogical result is, in itself, sufficient reason to
avoid such an application.
If the Court is willing to apply such an obscure presumption, it
should also be willing to consider the traditional defenses developed
within the English Common law. A showing of a very general grant,
such as "to the sea" was sufficient to show that the holder of an upland
manor had been granted the foreshore along with the uplands.225
And a showing that the area had been under the control of the
225. Id. at 195.
[Vol. 2
19811 BIGHORN .RIVER DECISION.AFTERMA TH 49
grantee for at least 60 years defeated claims by the Crown.2 26 The 1868
treaty between the Crow and the United States was signed 113 years
before the Montana v. United States decision and the Crow had main-
tained undisputed control over the Big Horn River from that time until
the present, as well as the 200 years prior to that.
A somewhat related idea is examined in Massachusetts v. New
York. When construing that grant, the Court said, "The applicable
principles of English law then well understood, the object of the grant,
contemporaneous. construction of it and usage under it for more than a
century, all are to be given consideration and weight. ' 227 The contem-
poraneous construction of the 1868 treaty could not have been, by ei-
ther of the treatying parties or surrounding settlers, that the waters
within the Crow Reservation were reserved for whites then moving into
the Montana Territory. The federal government, by reserving special
areas for the Crow, were presumably reserving surrounding areas for
settlers.
Nor did the State of Montana subsequently behave in such a man-
ner as to indicate that it believed navigable waters ceded by the Crow
had been reserved for the state. The Crow ceded lands encompassing
the Big Horn, Yellowstone, and Musselshell Rivers in 1868, 1891, 1892,
and 1904.228 Claims that sufficient amounts had not been paid the
Crow for these cessions were adjudicated by the Court of Claims. 229
The State of Montana did not at that time intervene and claim that the
Crow did not own the beds of these rivers. It was assumed by everyone
that sovereignty in those rivers had been in the Crow Tribe and that
they were the rightful recipients of adjustments for payments due for
those lands as well as all others.
And, most determinative, when the United States was purchasing
ceded land from the Crow throughout this period, some of which had
been reserved to the Crow in 1868, ceded land encompassing navigable
waters was paid for with no exclusions made for the beds of navigable
waters. The federal government assumed that lands reserved by the
Crow had contained the beds of navigable waters and that when it was
subsequently ceded to the United States the beds of navigable waters
were part of that ceded and paid for.
The contemporaneous meaning of the grant and usage for it for
113 years should have been given consideration and weight by the
Court in Montana v. United States.
226. Id. at 196.
227. Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65, 87 (1926).
228. Brief for United States, Appendix la, Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245
(1981).
229. The Crow Nation v. United States, 81 Ct. C1. 238 (1935).
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The presumption against granting, as will be remembered, origi-
nally developed to aid the Stewart kings in suits aimed at divesting
ownership in the foreshore of the English coast.23 In almost all Eng-
lish cases, however, the rule failed to have a practical effect. Almost
without exception, owners of upland manors and buildings along the
rivers of London had been able to prove ownership, either by evidence
of a grant, or by prescription. It is ironic that a specific rule of English
Common law, which could have no application in England today
where Parliment now is responsible for the "Great Waste" and as a
legislative body representing the people, could presumably grant away
the whole thing,"' continues to haunt the issue of sovereignty in navi-
gable waters in the United States.
Never before has the recipient of a grant by a United States sover-
eign been forced to overcome a presumption against such a grant.
Statements referring to such a rule were made in United States v. Ore-
gon and in Massachusetts v. New York, where it was found unlikely
that New York would intend to divest itself of sovereignty in lands
beneath navigable waters for reasons related to the public trust doc-
trine. "[A] grant of the soil under water in private ownership would
have set material limits on the free exercise of the sovereign control of
New York over the navigable waters of the state and on the free use of
the principal waterway of the newly settled territory." '232 In the cases
referring to this presumption, mention is made of it in passing without
discussion. It is as possible to refer to isolated statements within this
line of cases diametrically opposed to a presumption against a granting
by the sovereign. This statement, for instance, appears in Hardin v.
Jordan:
Where the government has not reserved any right or interest
that might pass by the grant, nor done any act showing an
intention of reservation, such as platting or surveying, we
must construe its grant most favorably for the grantee and
that it intended all that might pass by it.233
In a footnote, the Court stated, "Congress was, of course, aware of
this presumption once it was established by this Court.
234
The Court can, of course, at any time decide that the stream was
navigable at the time of statehood and title to the bed beneath vested in
the state as an incidence of sovereignty. We have seen that under the
operation of the doctrine, it makes no practical difference to possible
230. See text accompanying footnotes 51 to 67, supra.
231. Farnham, supra note 50, at 195, 198.
232. Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65, 88 (1926).
233. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1890).
234. Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 125 1 (1981).
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stream bed owners, as states are free to grant away soils beneath navi-
gable waters, as long as the granting is not detrimental to trust respon-
sibilities inuring to the state because of sovereignty.
It is quite another thing to engage in revisionism requiring altered
states of mind of the parties who engaged in treatying and granting in
the mid-nineteenth century. No one could know that grantees would
be forced to overcome a presumption against granting of lands beneath
navigable waters by the federal government prior to statehood until
this case was decided.
The presumption was never before applied against a sovereign
other than one responsible to uphold trust responsibilities for its citi-
zens in favor of fishing and navigation. It was established in England
to protect a trust obligation by the Crown in favor of citizens. It was
not applied against states in Martin v. Waddell. The Court found that
different rules should apply in the United States and states should be
free to dispose of lands beneath navigable waters as they saw fit. How-
ever, grants in derrogation of trust responsibilities were found to be
revokable in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois if grants were in conflict
with trust responsibilities. Massachusetts v. New York stated a pre-
sumption against granting by the State of New York, the sovereign
with municipal powers to uphold trust obligation in favor of citizens,
partially because "[A] grant of the soil under water in private owner-
ship would have set material limits on the free exercise of the sovereign
control of New York over the navigable waters of the state and on the
free use of the principal waterway of the newly settled territory.-
2 35
Never before 1981 was a presumption against granting applied to a
federal grant made before statehood in such a manner as to protect
rights of future citizens of a state. The federal government could not
have known that this application in 1981 would make it necessary that
their grant in 1868 be made "in clear or special words" or that it should
be "definitely declared or otherwise made plain." 2 6 The federal gov-
ernment, in fact, would assume that its responsibilities ran to the nation
as a whole to manage the public domain for the benefit of all citizens.
And even if such a presumption existed which could be overcome
only by a conveyance which was "definitely declared or otherwise
made plain," the parties to the Crow treaties of 1851 and 1868 could
not have known that it applied to rivers. It would be another eight
years before the Court first extended the doctrine of state sovereignty
over tidelands to the beds of navigable rivers, in that instance, the Mis-
sissippi, in Barney v. Keokuk in 1876. 237 Four years later the principle
235. Massachusetts v. New York, 279 U.S. 65, 88 (1926).
236. Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 1251 (1981).
237. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 325 (1876).
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
was generally applied in Packer v. Bird,238 and two years- later, in 1892,
it was extended to the Great Lakes.2 39
Even if it could have been known in 1851 or in 1868 that a pre-
sumption of granting must be overcome with clear language, it could
not clearly have been known to the treaty makers that state sovereignty
extended to inland streams larger than the Mississippi before 1892
when navigability in fact became an established test."
Speaking in 1890, in Hardin v. Jordan, the Court itself said,
The right of the States to regulate and control the shores of
tide waters, and the land under them is the same as that which
is exercised by the Crown in England. In this country the
same rule has been extended to our great navigable lakes,
which are treated as inland seas; and also, in some of the
States, to navigable rivers, as the Mississippi, the Missouri,
the Ohio, and in Pennsylvania, to all the permanent rivers of
the State; but it depends on the law of each State to what wa-
ters and to what extent this prerogative of the State over the
lands under water shall be exercised.24
The United States government cannot now be asked to have had a
clearer idea about the bodies of water to which state sovereignty had
extended than that expressed by the Court.
V. RESULTS OF THE CASE
The result of the case places a strip of land 50 miles long, within
the exterior boundaries of an ongoing Indian reservation, under abso-
lute state ownership, as proprietor and sovereign. As discussed above,
this is the first time a United States Supreme Court decision has had
this effect, or could, in fact, have had this effect.242 In Holt State Bank,
the Chippewas had ceded the area including Mud Lake to the United
States' government 36 years before. In Choctaw, and Brewer, most tri-
bal powers were officially terminated in the early 1900s.
The decision allows the intrusion of the state in a trust capacity
within an Indian reservation, something the Court itself has said is
impermissible.243
As a practical matter, the decision could allow the state of Mon-
tana to mine coal under the Big Horn River.
As another practical matter, when the Montana Fish and Game
238. Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1890).
239. Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
240. See text accompanying footnotes 120 to 128,npra.
241. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1890).
242. See discussion accompanying footnotes 164 to 167, supra.
243. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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Department opens the river to fishing, thousands of sports fishermen
from all parts of the globe are expected to converge on the river to take
advantage of what has been described as the best trout fishing in the
lower 48 states.2" Just as Indians were moved to satisfy late 19th cen-
tury needs for locatable minerals, they are now being exploited to sat-
isfy an important public demand of the late 20th century for recreation.
One bizarre result could obtain from the case. The Submerged
Lands Act quitclaimed the beds and banks of navigable waters to
states.245 The interpretation of the Act has placed congressional ap-
proval of state sovereignty upon lands found navigable by the Court.2 46
The congressional quitclaim, interestingly, applies to lands beneath
navigable streams, that is, determined by the Court as navigable
streams, "hereafter modified by accretion, erosion, and relictation. '247
In a concurring opinion in Hughes v. Washington, Justice Stewart
opined that accretion had resulted in a retroactive unconstitutional tak-
ing by the state of privately held lands.248 Under the facts in Montana
v. United States, there certainly will be areas of the Big Horn where
changes in the river, natural changes and those created by the Yellow-
tail Dam, have brought new areas of land under the bed and banks of
the river. It could be argued by parties not privy to Montana v. United
States that the State of Montana is responsible for any such taking over
coal beds. Montana could defend by raising the claim that the Big
Horn was not, in fact, navigable in those areas at the time Montana
attained statehood. Montana could raise that claim, whether or not it
were allowed, because the issue of navigability of the Big Horn was not
appealed in Montana v. United States.
The Court's role in this case is questionable. Indian matters have
244. "But fishermen are afraid the Fish and Game Commission's proposed daily limit of
three trout, only one longer than 24 inches, is too liberal and could wreck the river's
tremendous fishery.
"[T]he Bighorn could easily be the best trout stream in North America outside of
Alaska.... mhe big trout should be protected by allowing anglers to keep only one fisher
over 18 inches.
"Anglers are urging tighter regulations because fishing pressure is expected to be 'awe-
some,' Bailey said.
"'You will have corporate jets landing down there and everthin else,' he said.
"George Anderson, a Livingston fishing guide who plans to operate a guide service
from Fort Smith along the Bighorn, agreed with Bailey.
"'There's going to be a tremendous amount of pressure,' Anderson said. 'I know guys
all over the country who are willing to drop everything and come here anytime the river
opens."' The Missoulian, July 20, 1981, at 12, col. 3.
245. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301 etseq.
246. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
247. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (a)(1).
248. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967).
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traditionally been within Congress' domain.2 49 Although the Court in
Montana v. United States recognized the difference between formal
conveyances and federal Indian compacts, it did not defer to Congress'
power to deal with Indian tribes in any manner historically appropri-
ate. Rather, the Court has imposed strict hurdles Congress must over-
come to achieve its purpose. The result is an intrusion by the Court
into Congress' traditional plenary capacity to act as trustee for Indian
lands and Indian tribes. The Court has said that this authority is a
political one that has been exercised by Congress from the beginning
and is not subject to control by the judiciary.
VI. USE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO DETERMINE
SOVEREIGNTY IN LANDS BENEATH NAVIGABLE WATERS
The results of the Montana v. United States decision bring home
the necessity of finding a more suitable way to solve what will be a
continuing problem before the Court.
The intention of a federal government is determinative. There is
no constitutional doctrine which demands that lands beneath navigable
waters not be granted prior to statehood. The equal footing doctrine
demands that, at statehood, state sovereignty vest in lands beneath nav-
igable waters. Currently, the Court is using conveyancing rules in an
apparent attempt to determine whether a grant of navigable waters was
intended. Was the grant specific enough to show an actual intention to
include it and therefore overcome a presumption that such land is held
in trust for future states? In the past, as we have seen, a determination
of whether sovereignty vested in states was determined by whether
there was a need for the state to administer municipal plenary powers
to uphold and protect local needs for navigation, fishing and
commerce.
If such a need existed, sovereignty vested in the state. When look-
ing at grants or reservations of large areas of public lands and Indian
lands, the Court's inquiry should be to determine whether the federal
government foresaw future state activity within the area. If none was
anticipated, there would be no necessity to, and no intention on the
part of, the federal government to hold such lands in trust for future
states.
An examination of the contrasting situations in the Shively case
and Montana case is helpful. In Shively, individual settlers were
granted homesteads for purposes of cultivation under the Oregon Do-
nation Act. It would be natural to infer that a future need for state
sovereignty in the lands beneath navigable waters existed to protect the
249. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 556-66 (1903).
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grantee-settlers in their enjoyment of the use of navigable waters near
their settlements. In the case of the Crow, no such need existed. Indi-
ans looked to the federal government as the trustee who administered
in their favor. Any state trusteeship in favor of Indians were contrary
to congressional policy.
And there was no future need for the state to administer navigable
waters within reservations for future citizens of the state. Ample por-
tions of the public domain had been ceded to the federal government to
be used as areas for white settlement. They did not need the additional
use of navigable waters within Indian reservations.
A further inquiry should be made when determining the intention
of the federal government at the time of a pre-statehood grant. A vest-
ing of state sovereignty does more than place obligations upon the state
to support certain trusts in favor of citizens. Ownership in the state is
also proprietary, and gives the state the power to use that land as an
absolute owner. Gravel may be extracted from the beds of navigable
rivers. Oil may be leased. Coal may be mined from beneath the bed.
All this may be done, assuming that such activities are not in deroga-
tion of trust responsibilities. Would the federal government, when
treatying with the Crow, ever have intended that the state of Montana
be allowed to carry on those activities in an area set aside for the exclu-
sive use of the Crow? Such activities would surely be in conflict with
federal responsibilities to administer the area in trust for Indians.
And even though sovereignty might vest in a state, under the hold-
ing in the Winans case, it could be subject to easements in favor of
nearby Indian tribes. In short, federal servitudes in favor of Indian
tribes could exist. Under the rule of Martin v. Waddell, state sover-
eignty in lands beneath navigable waters vests subjects to constitutional
powers since surrendered to the federal government. Thus, although
state sovereignty has vested, conflicting federal servitudes imposed
upon the area could be such that the state has naked title only.
And one further inquiry should be made. Are the activities sup-
ported by the state within those municipal powers the state is obliged to
uphold? In Montana v. United States, the activity supported may not
be one of those trust obligations. Thejuspublicum supporting fishing
was in favor of the common people. State supported trust obligations
in the United States are to state citizens. The Montana Department of
Fish and Game seems actually to be supporting a trust in favor of rec-
reation for the elite--those able to take advantage of some of the
world's most splendid fishing. Activities by the state most in harmony
with the doctrine would support fishing activities of local people, most
of whom are Crow Indians. And the state's activities are such that they
may conflict with the federal government's servitude to support recrea-
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tion in the area. By stocking fish and encouraging the intrusion of an-
glers, the state is burdening the federal government in its attempt to
preserve a reserved place for Indians.
If the state's activities are not, in fact, those obligated by the public
trust doctrine, they should not be allowed. Under the facts of this case,
then, Montana is not administering the proper fishing trust. And, be-
cause of the nature of the Big Horn, the state has no need to administer
a trust in favor of navigation and commerce. There is no need, for
instance, to regulate harbors or provide for the building of wharves.
Even though, in this case, sovereignty has vested in the state, activities
supported by the public trust doctrine are either unnecessary or should
be discontinued because they are being inappropriately administered.
VII. CONCLUSION
In analyzing the Indian land cases, and federal reservation cases,
future control of the area should be considered. When the federal gov-
ernment negotiated waters with Indians, the tribes ceded land to the
United States Government and moved to smaller areas under a pro-
tected trust relationship with the United States Government. Different
circumstances prevailed when Congress opened the public domain to
settlement. In both these activities Congress was acting in a plenary
capacity. But while settlers and the United States Government nor-
mally articulated eventual state control, the United States Government
and Indians, who were promised protection from outside intrusion, did
not.
If states were to be afforded no future control within a granted
area, there was no need to "guarantee them full public enjoyment of
their watercourses" and therefore no need to hold such lands in trust
for future state sovereignty.
A failure to analyze the very area of law which produced the pub-
lic trust doctrine under the principles of that doctrine has resulted in
substantial state and federal conflicts that would be avoided by a new
look at the principles and duties involved in federal grants and reserva-
tions of public lands and Indian lands.
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